Character of a City illustrated by Riots.
New Material for History of Draft Riots. History of the
Rebellion incomplete without History of them. The Fate of
the Nation resting on the Issues of the Struggle in New York
City. The best Plan to adopt for Protection against Mobs.
The history of the riots that have taken place in a great
city from its foundation, is a curious and unique one, and
illustrates the peculiar changes in tone and temper that
have come over it in the course of its development and
growth. They exhibit also one phase of its moral character,
furnish a sort of moral history of that vast, ignorant,
turbulent class which is one of the distinguishing features
of a great city, and at the same time the chief cause of its
solicitude and anxiety, and often of dread.
The immediate cause, however, of my taking up the subject,
was a request from some of the chief actors in putting down
the Draft Riots of 1863, to write a history of them. It was
argued that it had never been written, except in a detached
and fragmentary way in the daily press, which, from the
hurried manner in which it was done, was necessarily
incomplete, and more or less erroneous.
It was also said, and truly, that those who, by their
courage and energy, saved the city, and who now would aid me
not only officially, but by their personal recollections and
private memoranda, would soon pass away, and thus valuable
material be lost.
Besides these valid reasons, it was asserted that the
history of the rebellion was not complete without it, and
yet no historian of that most important event in our
national life had given the riots the prominence they
deserved, but simply referred to them as a side issue,
instead of having a vital bearing on the fate of the war and
the nation. On no single battle or campaign did the destiny
of the country hinge as upon that short, sharp campaign
carried on by General Brown and the Police Commissioners
against the rioters in the streets of New York, in the
second week of July, 1863. Losses and defeats in the field
could be and were repaired, but defeat in New York would in
all probability have ended the war. It is not necessary to
refer to the immediate direct effects of such a disaster on
the army in the field, although it is scarcely possible to
over estimate the calamitous results that would have
followed the instantaneous stoppage, even for a short time,
of the vast accumulations of provisions, ammunition, and
supplies of all kinds, that were on their way to the army
through New York. Nor is it necessary to speculate on the
effect of the diversion of troops from the front that such
an event would have compelled, in order to recover so vital
a point. Washington had better be uncovered than New York be
lost. One thing only is needed to show how complete and
irreparable the disaster would have been; namely, the effect
it would have had on the finances of the country. With the
great banking houses and moneyed institutions of New York
sacked and destroyed, the financial credit of the country
would have broken down utterly. The crash of falling houses
all over the country that would have followed financial
disaster here, would have been like that of falling trees in
a forest swept by a hurricane. Had the rioters got complete
possession of the city but for a single day, their first
dash would have been for the treasures piled up in its
moneyed institutions. Once in possession of these, they,
like the mobs of Paris, would have fired the city before
yielding them up. In the crisis that was then upon us, it
would not have required a long stoppage in this financial
centre of the country to have effected a second revolution.
With no credit abroad and no money at home, the Government
would have been completely paralyzed. Not long possession of
the city was needed, but only swift destruction.
Doubtless the disastrous effects would have been increased
tenfold, if possible, by uprisings in other cities, which
events showed were to follow. Even partial success developed
hostile elements slumbering in various parts of the country,
and running from Boston almost to the extreme West.
In this view of the case, these riots assume a magnitude and
importance that one cannot contemplate without a feeling of
terror, and the truth of history requires that their proper
place should be assigned them, and those who put them down
have an honorable position beside our successful commanders
and brave soldiers. It is also important, as a lesson for
the future, and naturally brings up the question, what are
the best measures, and what is the best policy for the city
of New York to adopt, in order to protect itself from that
which today constitutes its greatest danger mob violence? If
it ever falls in ruins, the work of destruction will
commence and end within its own limits. We have a police and
city military which have been thought to be sufficient, but
experience has shown that though this provision may be ample
to restore law and order in the end, it works slowly, often
unwisely, and always with an unnecessary expenditure of
life. In conversing with those of largest experience and
intelligence in the police department on this subject of
such great and growing importance, we are convinced, from
their statements and views, a vast improvement in this
matter can be made, while the cost to the city, instead of
being increased, will be lessened; that is, a cheaper,
wiser, and more effectual plan than the present one can be
adopted. Of course this does not refer to mere local
disturbances, which the police force in the ordinary
discharge of its duties can quell, but to those great
outbreaks which make it necessary to call out the military.
Not that there might not be exigencies in which it would be
necessary to resort, not only to the military of the city,
but to invoke the aid of neighboring States; for a riot may
assume the proportions of a revolution, but for such no
local permanent remedy can be furnished.
The objections to relying on the military, as we invariably
do in case of a large mob, are many. In the first place, it
takes the best part of a day to get the troops together, so
that a mob, so far as they are concerned, has time not only
to waste and destroy for many hours, but increase in
strength and audacity. The members of the various regiments
are scattered all over the city, engaged in different
occupations and employments, and without previous notice
being given, it is a long and tedious process to get them to
their respective headquarters and in uniform. This wastes
much and most valuable time. Besides, they are compelled to
reach the mustering place singly or in small groups, and
hence liable to be cut off or driven back by the mob, which
in most cases would know the place of rendezvous.
In the second place, the members are taken out from the mass
of the people, between whom there might be a strong sympathy
in some particular outbreak, which would impair their
efficiency, and make them hesitate to shoot down their
friends and acquaintances.
In the third place, in ordinary peace times, these uniformed
regiments are not the steadiest or most reliable troops, as
was witnessed in the riots of 1863, as well as in those of
the Astor Place in 1849.
They hesitate, or are apt to become hasty or disorganized in
a close, confused fight, and driven back. In the
commencement of a riot, a defeat of the military gives
increased confidence, and indeed, power to a mob, and snakes
the sacrifice of life, in the end, far greater.
In the fourth place, clearing the streets does not always
dissipate a mob. A whole block of houses may become a
fortress, which it is necessary to storm before a permanent
victory is gained. Half disciplined men, unaccustomed, and
unskilled to such work, make poor headway with their muskets
through narrow halls, up stairways, and through scuttle
holes.
In the fifth place, the military of the city cannot be
called away from their work for two or three days, to parade
the city, without a heavy expense, and hence the process is
a costly one.
In the last place, the firing of these troops at the best is
not very judicious, and cannot be discriminating, so that
those are shot down often least culpable, and of least
influence in the mob in fact, more lives usually are taken
than is necessary.
The simplest, most efficient, and most economical plan would
be to select five hundred or more of the most courageous,
experienced, and efficient men from the police department,
and form them into a separate battalion, and have them
drilled in such evolutions, maneuvers, and modes of attack
or defense, as would belong to the work they were set apart
to do. A battery might be given them in case of certain
emergencies, and a portion carefully trained in its use. At
a certain signal of the bell, they should be required to
hasten, without a moment's delay, to their head-quarters. A
mob could hardly be gathered and commence work before this
solid body of disciplined, reliable men would be upon them.
These five hundred men would scatter five thousand rioters
like chaff before them. It would be more efficient than two
entire regiments, even if assembled, and would be worth more
than the whole military of the city for the first half day.
Besides, clubs are better than guns. They take no time to
load they are never discharged like muskets, leaving their
owners for the time at the mercy of the mob. Their volleys
are incessant and perpetual, given as long and fast as
strong arms can strike. They are also more discriminating
than bullets, hitting the guilty ones first. Moreover, they
disable rather than kill, which is just as effectual, and
far more desirable. In addition to all this, being trained
to one purpose, instructed to one duty, a mob would be their
natural enemies, and hence sympathy with them in any cause
almost impossible.
Great Riots of New York 1712 to 1873, Including a Full and Complete Account of the Four Days' Draft Riot of 1863