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Colonel Steptoe's
Report
On the day succeeding the return to Walla Walla, Colonel Steptoe dispatched the fol lowing report of the expedition to head quarters of the Department of the Pacific at San Francisco:
"Fort Walla Walla,
May 23, 1858.
Major:
On the 2nd instant I informed you of my intention to move northward with a part of my command. Accordingly, on the 6th I left here with C, E, and H, First dragoons, and E, Ninth infantry; in all, five company officers and one hundred and fifty-two enlisted men. Hearing that the hostile Pelouse were near Al-pon-on-we, in the Nez Perces land, I moved to that point, and was ferried across Snake river by Timothy, a Nez Perces chief. The enemy fled towards the north, and I followed leisurely on the road to Colville. On Sunday morning, the i6th, when near the To-hoto-nim-me in the Spokane country, we found ourselves suddenly in the presence of ten or twelve hundred Indians of various tribes Spokanes, Pelouses, Coeur d'Alenes, Yakimas, and some others all armed, painted, and defiant. I moved slowly on until just about to enter a ravine that wound along the bases of several hills, which were all crowned by the excited savages. Perceiving that it was their purpose to attack us in this dangerous place, I turned aside and encamped, the whole wild, frenzied mass moving parallel to us, and, by yells, taunts, and menaces, apparently trying to drive us to some initiatory act of violence. Towards night a number of chiefs rode up to talk with me, and inquired what were our motives to this intrusion upon them. I answered that we were passing on to Colville, and had no hostile intentions toward the Spokanes, who had always been our friends, nor towards any other tribes who were friendly; that my chief aim in coming so far was to see the Indians and the white people at Col ville, and, by friendly discussion with both, endeavor to strengthen their good feelings for each other. They expressed themselves satisfied, but would not consent to let me have canoes, without which it would be impossible to cross the Spokane River. I concluded, for this reason, to retrace my steps at once, and the next morning (17th) turned back towards this post. We had not marched three miles when the Indians, who had gathered on the hills adjoining the line of march, began an attack upon the rear guard, and immediately the fight became general. We labored under the great disadvantage of having to defend the pack-train while in motion and in a rolling country peculiarly favor able to the Indian mode of warfare. We had only a small quantity of ammunition, but, in their excitement, the soldiers could not be restrained from firing it in the wildest manner. They did, however, under the leading of their respective commanders,
Surgeon John F. Randolph
sustain well the reputation of the army for some hours, charging the enemy repeatedly with gallantry and success. The difficult and dangerous duty of flanking the column was assigned to Brevet Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Gaston, to both of whom it proved fatal. The latter fell about twelve o'clock, and the enemy soon after charging formally upon his company, it fell back in confusion and could not be rallied. About a half hour after this Captain Taylor was brought in mortally wounded, upon which I immediately took possession of a convenient height and halted. The fight continued here with unabated activity, the Indians occupying neighboring heights and working themselves along to pick off our men. The wounded increased in number continually. Twice the enemy gave unmistakable evidence of a design to carry our position by assault, and their number and desperate courage caused me to fear the most serious consequences to us from such an attempt on their part. It was manifest that the toss of their officers and comrades began to tell upon the spirit of the soldiers; that they were becoming discouraged, and not to be relied upon with confidence. Some of them were recruits but recently joined; two of the companies had musketoons, which were utterly worthless in our present condition; and, what was most alarming, only two or three rounds of cartridges remained to some of the men, and but few to any of them. It was plain that the enemy would give the troops no rest during the night, and they would be still further disqualified for stout resistance on the morrow, while the number of enemies would certainly be increased. I determined, for these reasons, to make a forced march to Snake River, about eighty-five miles distant, and secure the canoes in advance of the Indians, who had already threatened to do the same by us. After consulting with the officers, all of whom urged me to the step as the only means in their opinion of securing the safety of the command, I concluded to abandon everything that might impede our march. Accordingly we set out about ten o'clock in perfectly good order, leaving the disabled animals and such as were not in condition to travel so far and so fast, and, with deep pain I have to add, the two howitzers. The necessity for this last measure will give you, as well as many words, a conception of the strait to which we believed ourselves to be reduced. Not an officer of the command doubted that we would be overwhelmed with the first rush of the enemy upon our position in the morning; to retreat further by day, with our wounded men and property, was out of the question; to retreat slowly by night equally so, as we could not then be in condition to fight all next day; it was therefore necessary to relieve ourselves of all encumbrances and to fly. We had no horses able to carry the guns over 80 miles without resting, and if the enemy should attack us en route, as, from their ferocity, we certainly expected they would, not a soldier could be spared for any other duty than skirmishing. For these reasons, which I own candidly seemed to me more cogent at the time than they do now, I re solved to bury the howitzers. What distresses me is that no attempt was made to bring them off; and all I can add is that if this was an error of judgment it was committed after the calmest discussion of the matter, in which, I believe, every officer agreed with me.
Enclosed is a list of the killed and wounded. The enemy acknowledge a loss of 9 killed and 40 or 50 wounded, many of them mortally. It is known to us that this is an underestimate, for one of the officers informs me that on a single spot where Lieutenants Gregg and Gaston met in a joint charge twelve dead Indians were counted. Many others were seen to fall.
I cannot do justice, in this communication, to the conduct of the officers throughout the affair. The gallant bearing of each and all was accompanied by an admirable coolness and sound judgment. To the skill and promptness of Assistant Surgeon Randolph the wounded are deeply indebted.
Be pleased to excuse the hasty appearance of this letter; I am anxious to get it off and have not time to have it transcribed.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. J. Steptoe, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel United States Army.
Major W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco."
In due course this report reached the Lieutenant General of the armies of the United States, who transmitted it to the Secretary of War after in scribing upon it the following endorsement:
"This is a candid report of a disastrous affair. The small supply of ammunition is surprising and unaccounted for. It seems that Brevet Brigadier General Clarke has ordered up all the disposable troops in California, and probably will further rein force Step-toe's district by detachments of the Fourth and Ninth infantry; and, on the 29th ultimo, I gave instructions for sending the Sixth or Seventh regiment of infantry from Salt Lake val ley across the Pacific and via Walla Walla, if practicable, in preference to any route south of that.
Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War
Winfield Scott
July 15, 1858.
Accompanying the foregoing report was the following:
Fort Walla Walla
May 23, 1858
Major:
I take the liberty to recommend as the very first step in prosecuting the war with the northern tribes, the establishment of a post on Snake river, near the mouth of the Pelouse a temporary work, from which the garrison can fall back to this point upon the approach of winter. The road to Colville crosses there, but the great advantage of having such an advanced post will be in thus obtaining a sure ferry. I had vast difficulty in getting the dragoon horses over Snake River, which is everywhere wide, deep, and strong, and without the assistance of Timothy's Nez Perces it would have been utterly impossible for us to cross, either going or returning. Besides this, the Pelouse tribe ought to be the first one struck at, as it is the most hostile, and was guilty, a few weeks since, of murdering two white men on the Colville road.
A few companies of infantry could construct a kind of entrenchment there in a few days, which one company could easily defend, and at the same time guard the ferry-boat. There is absolutely no other way of crossing the stream with certainty.
I hope the general will send us as strong a force as possible, and with all the dispatch possible. The tribes around this post are watching eagerly to see what they can gain by joining the hostile party. One of my keenest regrets growing out of the late affair is the consciousness that our defeat must, until something is done to check it, encourage the wavering to active hostilities.
All the companies here are now busily drilling as skirmishers, in which branch of instruction the dragoons, although very gallant, showed themselves not at all proficient the other day, and they will soon be ready to take the field again; but I hope the force here will not, for manifest reasons, be reduced before the arrival of other troops from below.
There is a band of Nez Perces, perhaps fifty or seventy-five, at present here, who took their arms as soon as they heard of my difficulty, but met me on my return. Their services can easily be secured, I think if the general desires it, and no doubt they would be valuable auxiliaries if in no other way, certainly as instructors to our soldiers in the mode of Indian warfare.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. J. Steptoe, Brevet Lieut. Colonel U. S. Army, Commanding Post.
Major W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.
Fort Walla Walla
May 23, 1858
Major:
I received by last mail the order to furnish Lieutenant Mullan an escort of one officer and sixty-five soldiers.
Of course the present state of our relations with the northern tribes will make it impossible for Lieutenant Mullan to proceed with his survey.
In this connexion I may inform you that the fight with my command only committed the Indians to hostilities a little earlier, and probably under more fortunate circumstances for us. A few minutes before the attack upon us, Father Joseph (Joset), the priest at Coeur d'Alene mission, joined me and stated to me that most of the excitement among the tribes was due to mischievous reports that the government intended to seize their lands, in proof of which they were invited to ob serve whether a party would not soon be surveying a road through it. He added that the Coeur d'Alenes, Spokanes and Flatheads had bound themselves to massacre any party that should attempt to make a survey. I do not doubt in the least the truth of this statement, and make no question that Lieutenant Mullan's party has been saved from destruction by late occurrences.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. J. Steptoe, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel U. S. A., Commanding Post.
Major W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.
With reference to Lieutenant John Mullan's party, mentioned in this letter, as well as in that succeeding: The government had decided upon establishing a military road from old Fort Walla Walla (Wallula), on the Columbia River, to Fort Benton, on the Missouri river. By reason of his well-known skill, and his knowledge of the mountain section through which it was intended the road should pass, and the experience gained during the previous four years while assisting Isaac I. Stevens in searching out a route for a Pacific railroad from Minnesota to the Pacific coast, Mullan was chosen for this task. The road was to be located with a view, also, to its utility as a railroad route.
This intrepid engineer and explorer arrived at Fort Dalles on the I5th of May, 1858, at which point he had been instructed to prepare his outfit. General Clarke had been directed to furnish him with an escort of sixty-five men, and it had been arranged that the escort should join him at Walla Walla. He lost no time in organizing his company of surveyors and road builders at The Dalles, and starting on his way, bridging the streams and smoothing down a track as he journeyed up the Columbia River.
From his report of the construction of that great highway which has since been known as the "Mullan route," and which was for many years the path way of emigrants and miners, the following is quoted:
"I had not proceeded further than the Five-Mile creek when the news reached me of the lamentable defeat of Colonel Steptoe on the Spokane plains, a point directly in the route of my intended location. The news, though much exaggerated, as is usual on the frontier, was such as to cause me to halt at this point till I could confer by letter with Colonel Steptoe regarding the strength of the Indians in the field and the prospect of my being furnished with an escort from Fort Walla Walla, where he then commanded. To construct the wagon road while the Indians were in a state of open hostility was out of the question, but it was necessary for me to possess authentic facts before I could either move forward or break up the expedition. During the interval I occupied my men in building the bridges now over the Five-Mile and Ten-Mile creeks, and in otherwise improving the wagon road from The Dalles to the Des Chutes. On the 3Oth of May a reply was received from Colonel Steptoe, from which I judged it impracticable to prosecute the work this season. I therefore returned to The Dalles and disbanded my expedition, with the exception of Mr. Kolecki, my topographer, Mr. Sohon, my guide, and the men necessary to take care of my stock, reporting the facts immediately to the war department.
On learning of Colonel Steptoe's defeat, General Clarke immediately determined upon retaliatory measures, and, with this view, promptly ordered to the field a well-appointed and well-equipped command, under Colonel George Wright, Ninth infantry.
I had no disposition to remain idle during the summer, but, on the contrary, was anxious to become personally cognizant of such topographical facts as would give me a correct idea of the western section of the country through which our road would pass. I therefore addressed a communication to General Clarke, and offered the services of myself and party to join any command going into the field, stating that, having instruments and material, we were in a condition to collect and prepare any topographical facts and features that the march might develop. I would here state that the region lying between the Spokane and Snake rivers was only known to me through the reports and maps of others; and to say, a priori, where the line should or should not be located was no easy matter. General Clarke accepting the services offered him, I was assigned to duty on Colonel Wright's staff, as topographical officer, and, with my party, accompanied him against the Indians who had defeated Colonel Steptoe."
In this the daring, restless activity of the man is modestly indicated. On reaching Fort Walla Walla with Wright's force, Mullan was placed in command of the Nez Perces allies who served in the campaign and who, as shown by the official reports, rendered valiant and valuable services, not withstanding their discipline occasionally lacked somewhat in conformity to the full requirements of the tactics.
In his capacity as topographical officer he executed maps showing the plans of the various engagements, routes, etc., and drew a map showing the Steptoe battlefield, as reproduced in this volume.
It is noteworthy that the pass through the Rocky Mountains, discovered by Mullan while seeking a route for the military road, was afterward followed by the Northern Pacific railroad.
The construction of this military road, which required four years, 1858 to 1862, under the most difficult conditions, was a feat of engineering which has seldom been excelled in western high way building. Sections of the old road are still in use.
Headquarters Fort Dalles, O. T.
May 26, 1858.
Sir:
By the next steamer you will doubtless receive the report of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, recounting the unfortunate termination of his northern expedition. That all the Indians in that section of country have combined for a general war there is not a shadow of doubt. They are numerous, active, and perfectly acquainted with the topography of the country; hence a large body of troops will be necessary if, as I presume, it is designed to bring those Indians under subjection, and signally chastise them for their unwarranted attack upon Colonel Steptoe.
It is my opinion that one thousand troops should be sent into that country, thus enabling the commander to pursue the enemy in two or three columns.
The posts east of the Cascades are small, and I do not think it will be prudent at this moment to reduce them, as there is much agitation among the friendly Indians in consequence of this affair of Colonel Steptoe, and south of us, distant seventy miles, there is a large body of Indians on the 'Warm Spring' reservation; they are now perfectly friendly, but should they be tampered with by the hostiles and no military force at hand to overcome them, it is difficult to say what their course would be.
The steamboat which was built to run on the upper Columbia unfortunately went over the Cascades; this is a serious detriment to us, as well as to the owners; were she now running above the Des Chutes her services would be of the greatest importance. The supplies at Walla Walla at this moment are very limited; in fact a few days since they were almost destitute of flour; however, a supply is now on the way to that place.
I think that we may now look forward to a protracted war, and it behooves us to prosecute it systematically, with an ample supply of the personnel and material, to guard against a possibility of failure.
Should the difficulties with the Mormons have been terminated (as is rumored) probably a force could be drawn from that country to aid in the coming struggle.
Lieutenant Mullan with his party will remain near here until he hears from Colonel Steptoe, but there is no probability that he will be able to construct the road this year; in fact, it is said that this proposed opening a road through the Indian country was a primary cause of the attack on Colonel Steptoe, and had Lieutenant Mullan preceded Colonel Steptoe his whole party would have been sacrificed.
I have temporarily suspended the order for Lieutenant Hughes to proceed to Fort Walla Walla, as I presume that the design of the general in sending a subaltern there was to enable the commander of the post to furnish the escort to Lieu tenant Mullan. Should the party advance Lieu tenant Hughes will proceed with it.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
G. Wright, Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.
Major W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, San Francisco, Cal.
Fort Walla Walla
May 29, 1858
Major:
Since my return to this post the Indians in this vicinity who began to show much restlessness have become quiet again. Reports were busily circulated amongst them that my command had been utterly destroyed, and many of them were dis posed to take advantage of our supposed condition.
I ought to advise you that, from the best information to be obtained, about half of the Spokanes, Coeur d'Alenes, and probably of the Flatheads, nearly all of the Pelouses, a portion of the Yakimas, and I think a small number of Nez Perces, with scattered families of various petty tribes, have been for some time, and are now, hostile.
It is impossible to say what force they can bring together, but of course they cannot keep together long a force of any size.
A good strong column of three or four hundred infantry, with two or three companies of mounted men, would be able to beat them, I think, under all circumstances, or else to disperse them thoroughly, which would have nearly the same effect. It is unfortunate that such a column cannot be sent out before the season for gathering roots has passed.
There is much doubt on my mind where the Indians obtained their ammunition, of which they had abundance. Some persons believe that the Coeur d'Alene priest furnished it, but I do not credit that; my impression is that it was obtained either from the Colville traders or the Mormons. The priest, in conversation with me, alluded to the report so injurious to his reputation, and added that it was a charge too monstrous for him to notice it in a formal way.
Of one thing the general may be assured, and that is that the tribes through whose lands the proposed road to Fort Benton will run are resolved to prevent it, and before even a survey can be made they will have to be chastised.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. J. Steptoe, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A., Commanding Post.
Major W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.
Father Joset, the Catholic priest in charge of the Coeur d'Alene mission, was very active in his efforts to prevent the people among whom he labored from joining in any acts of hostility toward Colonel Steptoe. In endeavoring to reach the scene of the conflict before the beginning of trouble, he performed a long, fatiguing journey on horseback, arriving, however, after the tares of war had been well sown, and too late to be of potent service in the cause of peace; yet, regardless of the hostile determination apparent among the Indians, he never ceased his labors of pacification until the air had become vibrant with the actual din of battle. His is, without doubt, the most authentic account of the battle ever compiled from information obtained solely from the Indians' point of view. The beginning of the conflict, as will be seen, came under his own observation. Not many days after the fight he proceeded to Vancouver, and at the solicitation of Father Congiato, his superior, com mitted to writing this account:
Vancouver,
June 27, 1858.
My Reverend Father:
I am going to try and satisfy the demand that you have made of me for a detailed relation of the events of the unfortunate 17th of May, and of the causes which have brought such sad results.
Do not think, my reverend father, that I am beknowing to all the affairs of the savages, there is a great deal wanting; they come to us about the affairs of their conscience, but as to the rest they consult us but little.
I asked one day of Michel the question if a plot was brewing among the Indians? Do you think that there would be any one in it who would warn the missionary? No one, he replied. This was to tell me implicitly that he himself would not inform me o>f it. However, the half-breeds should know it, added I, much less still than the father. After the battle, Bonaventure, one of the best young men in the nation, who was not in the fight, and who, as I will tell later, has aided us a great deal in saving the lives of the Americans who were at the mission at the time of the battle, Bonaventure said to me, do you think that if we thought to kill the Americans we would come to tell you so? You appear also to think that we can do almost anything with the Indians. Far from it. Even among the Coeur d'Alenes there is a certain number
that we never see, that I do not know in any manner. The majority mistrust me when I come to speak in favor of the Americans. Those who were present at the assembly called by Governor Stevens, in the Spokan prairie, will not have for gotten how much the Indians insisted the troops should not pass the river Nez Perces. I have heard the Indians insinuate several times that they had no objections to the Americans passing through their country in small numbers, but much to their passing in force, as if to make laws. Last winter Michel still said to me: 'Father, if the soldiers exhibit themselves in the country (of the mountains) the Indians will become furious.' I had heard rumors that a detachment would come to Colville; it was only rumor, and having to go down in the spring having also written to you to that effect, I intended to go to inform .Colonel Steptoe of this disposition of the Indians. Toward the beginning of April it was learned that an American had been assassinated by a Nez Perce. Immediately rumor commences to circulate that the troops were preparing to cross the Nez Perces to obtain vengeance for this crime. Toward the end of April, at the time of my departure, the chief Pierre Prulin told me 'not to go now, to wait some weeks to see what turn affairs are going to take.' I am too hurried, I replied to him; I cannot wait, and as the parents of the young men whom I have chosen appear troubled, I will choose other companions and country. Arrived at the Gomache prairie I met the express of the great chief Vincente; this told me to return, his people thought there was too much danger at that moment. I replied that I was going to wait three days, to give the chief time to find me himself; that if he did not come, I would continue my route. I said to myself if Vincente believes really in the greatness of the danger, however bad or however long the road may be, he will not fail to come. In the meantime, I saw several Nez Perces. Their conversation was generally against the Americans; one of them said in my presence, we will not be able to bring the Coeur d'Alenes to take part with us against the Americans. The priest is the cause; it is for this that we wish to kill the priest.
Vincent marched day and night to find me; below are in substance the reasons he instanced to make me return. Of the danger on the part of the Americans I well know that there is none; neither is there any danger for your person on the part of the Indians. You would be able, however, to come back on foot, but we are not on good terms with the Pelouses and the Nez Perces; they are after us without cessation to determine us in the war against the Americans. We are so fatigued with their underhand dealings that I do not know if we will not come to break entirely with them. Their spies cover the country in every sense. When the young men go for the horses they will kill them secretly, and start the report that they have been killed by the Americans; then there will not be any means to restrain our people. We hear the chief of the soldiers spoken of only by the Nez Perces, and it is all against us and to excite our young people. I have great desire to go to see him. It was agreed that when I should go down I would take him to see the colonel; it is then I learned a part of the rumors which were spreading over the country. A white man had said, 'Poor Indians, you are finished now; the soldiers are preparing to cross the river to destroy you; then another five hundred soldiers will go to establish themselves at Colville; then five hundred others will rejoin them; then others and others until they find themselves the strongest; then they will chase the Indians from the country/ Still another white man had seen five hundred soldiers encamped upon the Pelouse preparing themselves to cross the river. All the above passed three weeks before the last events, Among other things, he said to me: 'If the troops are coming to pass the river, I am sure the Nez Perces are going to direct them upon us, I did not then pay much attention to this statement, but later I saw that he had not been deceived in his predictions, as difficult as it is for a white to penetrate an Indian, just so difficult is it for one Indian to escape another. To return to the mission: I was not without anxiety about what might happen in case the troops should come into the country. I was almost sure of the dispositions of the chiefs and of a majority of the nation; but I knew also a part of the youths are hot headed, not easy to be governed in a first moment of irritation; also that Kenuokin (Kamiakin) might make a great many proselytes. I had not forgotten the infernal maxim of Voltaire, 'mutons toujours, il en restera quelque lieu, was true, and that there ought to remain something in the hearts of our people of the thousand and one stories of this horrible Indian. I do not know, however, yet that he repeated without cessation to the Indians: the father is white like the Americans; they have but one heart; they treated the young Coeur d'Alenes like women, like prairie wolves, who only know how to make a noise.
On the 15th of May I received another express from Vincent. The troops had passed the Nez Perces; they had said to the Coeur d'Alenes that it was for them the soldiers wished; he desired me to go to aid him. in preventing a conflict; he told me to be quick, the troops were near; I set out in an instant; I had enough trouble to stop these young men who were working at the mission, it was an excitement that you could scarcely imagine. The good old Pierre Vincent not only refused to con duct me in his canoe to the lake, but bluntly refused to loan me his canoe; never before was I in such a situation. The distance from the mission to Vincent's camp was, I think, about ninety miles; as the water was very high I could only arrive on the evening of the i6th. Vincent told me he had been kept very busy to retain his young men ; that he had been at first to the chief of the soldiers and had asked him if he had come to fight the Coeur d'Alenes, that upon his negative reply he had said 'Well, go on,' but to his great displeasure he had camped in his neighborhood (about six miles) ; that then he had made his people retire, still a blood-thirsty Pelouse was endeavoring to excite them; later other Indians confirmed to me the same report; they were Vincent and the Spokans' chief, who prevented the fight on the I5th instant. The chiefs of the different tribes and a quantity of other Indians collected around me. I spoke to them to persuade them to peace. I told them that they did not know with what intention the chief of the soldiers was coming, that the next day they should bring me a horse, and that they might accompany me till in sight of the camp of the soldiers; that I would then go alone to find the officers in command, and would make them to know then what was now doubtful; they appeared well satisfied. I said still to Vincent to see that no person took the advance. The same evening they came from the camp of the Pelouse to announce that one of the slaves of the soldiers (it is thus that they call the Indians who accompany the troops) had just ar rived. The chief of the soldiers would have said, according to him, 'You Coeur d'Alenes, you are well-to-do; your lands, your women are ours, I told the Coeur d'Alenes not to believe it, that no officer ever spoke in that way; tomorrow I will ask the chief of the soldiers if he has said that. The next morning I saw the Spokan's Tshequyseken 'Priest.' Said he to me, 'Yesterday evening I was with the chief of the soldiers, when a Pelouse came to tell him that the priest has just arrived; he has brought some powder to the Coeur d'Alenes to en courage them to kill the soldiers;' then turning round toward the Coeur d'Alenes, 'Do you see now the deceit of this people?' Said I, they go and slander us before the soldiers, and slander the soldiers here. When they had brought me a horse, I went to the camp of the soldiers; they were far off.
I set out in their direction to join them. I saw Colonel Steptoe; made him acquainted with the disposition of the Indians, the mistrust the presence of the troops would inspire, and how I had been kept from going to inform him in the spring. He told me that, having heard by letter from Colville that the whites had had some difficulty with the In dians, he had at first resolved to go there with a few men, to talk with the whites and Indians, and to try and make them agree, but having learned that the Pelouses were badly disposed, he had determined to take a stronger escort; that, had he known the Spokans and Coeur d'Alenes dreaded the presence of the armed force, he would not have come without having notified them; that he was much surprised the evening before to see the In dians; that they had always talked peaceably to him, then to come to meet him with such hostile demonstration, he had well thought they would come to blows; that he was happy to return without spilling blood. I asked him if he did not desire to see the chiefs; upon his reply that his dragoon horses were too much frightened to stop long, I observed to him that they could talk in marching; he then said he would take pleasure in seeing them. I went to seek them. I could only find Vincent; him I conducted to the colonel; he was fully satisfied with him. One of the Indians who accompanied the troops gave Vincent a blow over the shoulders with his whip, saying to him, 'Proud man, why do you not fire?' Then accused one of the Coeur d'Alenes who had followed Vincent of having wished to fire upon a soldier. Vincent was replying to the colonel, when his uncle come to seek him, saying the Pelouses were about commencing to fire. I warned the colonel of it, and then went with Vincent to try and restrain the Spokanes and Coeur d'Alenes; when we had made them acquainted with the disposition of the colonel, they appeared well satisfied. Victor, one of the braves, who has since died of his wounds, said we have nothing more to do here, we will each one go to his home. Jean Pierre, the chief, supported the proposition of Victor; then Malkapsi became furious. I did not at the time know why. I found out later that he wished all to go to the camp of Vincent to talk over their affairs. Malkapsi slapped Jean Pierre, and struck Victor with the handle of his whip. I seized the infuriated man; a few words sufficed to calm him. I set out then with a few chiefs to announce at the camp that all was tranquil; a half hour or an hour afterwards what was my surprise to learn that they were fighting. I had well indeed to ask for a horse; there was in the camp only old men and women; it was about 3 o'clock when they brought me a heavy wagon horse. I set out, however, with the hope of getting there by night, when I was met by an Indian, who told me it was useless to fatigue myself, the Indians are enraged at the death of their people, they will listen to no one, whereupon I re-turned^ to my tent, the dagger in my heart. The following is the cause of this unhappy conflict as it has been related to me: The parents of Malkapsi, irritated and ashamed of his passion, said to him: 'What do you do? You maltreat your own people!
If you wish to fight, behold your enemies, (pointing to the troops); then saying, 'Oh, well, let us go and die,' they ran toward the troops; I do not think there was more than a dozen of them. The affair did not become serious until Jacques, an excellent Indian, well beloved, and Zacharia, brother-in-law of the great chief Vincent, had been killed; then the fury of the Indians knew no bounds. The next day I asked those that I saw, 'What provocation have you received from the troops?' 'None,' said they. 'Then you are only murderers, the authors of the death of your own people.' 'This is true; the fault can in no way be attributed to the soldiers; Malkapsi is the cause of all the evil.' But they were not all so well disposed. When I asked others what the soldiers had done to them, they re plied to me: 'And what have we done to them, that they should come thus to seek us? If they were going to Colville,' said they, 'why do they not take the road, no one of us would then think of molesting them. Why do they go to cross the Nez Perce so high up? Why direct themselves in the interior of our country, removing themselves further from Colville? Why direct themselves, then, upon the place, where we were peaceably occupied in digging our roots? Is it us who have been to seek the soldiers, or the soldiers who have come to fall upon us with their cannon?' Thus, although they avow that they fired first, they pretend that the first act of hostility came from the troops. I asked them if they had taken scalps. They told me no, with the exception of a small piece that had been taken by a half fool. I asked
Father Joset
them, also, if they had interred the dead. They replied that the women had buried them, but that the Pelouses had opened the graves which were at the encampment. It is then, also, that the Indians told me: We see now that the father did not deceive us when he told us that the soldiers wished peace. We forced them to fight; we fired a long time upon them before they answered our fire. As to the actual disposition of the Indians (Coeur d'Alenes), I think they can be recapitulated as fol lows:
1st, Regret for what has happened; all pro testing that there was nothing premeditated ; seeing that all the chiefs and the nation in general were decided upon peace ; it was an incident that brought to life the anger of the older men.
2nd, Disposition to render up what they have taken from the troops, in order to have peace.
3rd, If peace is refused them, determination to fight to the last.
I knew, from Colonel Steptoe, that his guide had told him that he was conducting him to Colville by the nearest road. Now that the guide mistook himself so grossly is absurd to suppose. It appears necessary to conclude that in conducting the troops straight upon the camp of the Indians, he had design. It cannot be supposed that he ignored the irritation that the presence of the troops would produce upon the Indians; and as for the rest, the intriguing of this guide is well known. I see no other way to explain his conduct than to say he laid a snare for the Coeur d'Alenes, whom he wished to humiliate, and that seeing afterwards the troops fall in the ditch that he had dug for others, he has done everything possible to draw them from it.
The Coeur d'Alenes say, also, that it was cried to them from the midst of the troops: 'Courage! you have already killed two chiefs;' that one of the Nez Perces who followed the troops, came back to say to his people: 'It is not the Coeur d'Alenes, but, indeed, the soldiers who killed the two Nez Perces, because they said that they wished to save themselves on the side of the Indians.' Neither the Coeur d'Alenes, nor the Spokanes, nor the Chaudries, the Pend d'Oreilles, and the Petes Plattes had spilt white blood; they pride themselves for it. If the war commence now, it is probable it will terminate only by the extermination of these tribes, for their country is so difficult of access that it will be impossible to terminate it in a year or two, and almost equally impossible that it continue without all these tribes, including the Pieds Noirs, taking part in it. When Governor Stevens was to see the Pieds Noirs to make a treaty with them, they said to our Indians: Until now we have quarreled about one cow, but now we are surprised by a third; we will unite ourselves against him; if the Americans attack you, I will aid you; if they attack me you will aid me. The war will cost thousands of lives, and all for an affair unpremeditated, and for which the Indians feel much regret. You will easily believe me, my reverend father, when I tell you I would purchase back with my life this unhappy event; not on my own account; I have been, and will be, much slandered; but what are the judgments of man to me, when God is my witness that I have done everything in my power to preserve peace? Your reverence knows very well that we have always threatened our Indians to quit them if they exhibit themselves hostile against the whites. They expect to see themselves abandoned; I have told them positively we will go. To quit them, actually would be to deliver them to the deceit of Kanuokin, and to light, I think, a universal war throughout the whole country. What pains me is to see the ruin of so many good Indians. What breaks my heart, is to see Colonel Steptoe, the zealous protector of Indians, exposed to the blame which ordinarily attaches itself to bad success; however, in the eyes of reflecting men, who know his situation, his retreat will do him infinite honor. It is not, I think, the first officer you will meet who could have drawn himself out from so bad a situation, surrounded by an army of ferocious beasts, hungry after their prey; of Indians sufficiently numerous to relieve each other, and who had always the means of procuring fresh horses. It appeared impossible that the troops could escape. Besides, the plan of the Indians was not to give them any rest until they had crossed the Nez Perce; the Spokanes were to be there early on the morning of the eighteenth to relieve the Coeur d'Alenes. In a position so critical, the colonel deceived the vigilance of his enemies, and throwing them his provisions, as an inducement to delay, he defeated their plan. He foresaw, without doubt, that the Indians on the one hand had let him take the advance, and on the other tempted by the booty abandoned the pursuit; so that if the troops have escaped, they owe it to the sagacity of the colonel.
At the mission they were on the point of having a tragedy. Four Americans had arrived there with some half-breeds and Canadians. After my departure to go to see the Colonel from Colville, they went to the Flathead country. On the evening of the 18th the news reached them of the battle, and of the death of Jacque, Zacary and Victor. Immediately the women commenced to cry that it was necessary to avenge their deaths. Our two brothers got wind of what was passing. Whilst brother McGeon harangued them at his best to try and bring them back to humane sentiments, the good old Francois ran with all his might around the marsh, through water and brushes to their encampment, to inform them of the danger. They immediately hid themselves. The next day, the nineteenth, one of them came back to the encampment, saying he would as soon die by the hands of the Indians as by starvation in the woods. The half-breeds saved him by saying he was not an American, but a Dane. The Indians were now ashamed of their conduct. Adrian, who had been one of the most ardent, showed himself afterwards one of the most faithful; he came to warn us when there was any new danger. The Indians told the half-breeds to go and seek the Americans, who were miserable in the woods. One of the Indians opposed it. He since declared to me that his anger was not yet allayed, and that he was afraid of being carried away by his passion to commit some bad deed. In fact, the Americans who came in the evening were very near being killed. Adrian having warned us that his life was in danger, we made him come to our house. They are all in safety now. No person has aided us in saving them more than the Indian Bonaventure. When I had set out, he had gone to accompany them to Clark's river, showing them a new road, the ordinary road being still impracticable.
Je suis avec respect, mon reverend pere, votre tres humble serviteur,
P. Joset, S. J."
Additional Resources
Notes About the Book:
Source: The Indian Tribes of North America, by John R. Swanton, 1953, Bureau of
American Ethnology, Bulletin 145, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC.
Online Publication: The manuscript was scanned and then ocr'd. Minimal editing
has been done, and readers can and should expect some errors in the textual
output.
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