Major Anthony's Testimony

In another part of his testimony, Major Anthony said referring to the Arapaho, "I considered them differently from the Cheyenne," and when asked if they were with the Cheyenne at Sand Creek, replied, "I understood, afterwards, that some six or eight or ten lodges of the Arapaho were there."

Major S. G. Colley, the Indian agent, said in his testimony, "Left Hand's band had gone out to Sand Creek," and when asked how many were in Left Hand's band, replied, "About eight lodges of about five to the lodge."

If there were no other evidence, the following telegrams from General Curtis, Commander of the Department of Missouri, are in themselves sufficient proofs of the hostility of both Cheyenne and Arapaho:

To Colonel Chivington:

I hear that Indians have committed depredations

on or near Platte River. Do not let district lines prevent pursuing and punishing them.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

Ft. Leavenworth, May 30th, 1864.

To Colonel Chivington:

Some four hundred Cheyenne attacked Lieut. Clayton on Smoky Hill. After several hours fight the Indians fled, leaving twenty-eight killed. Our loss four killed and three wounded. Look out for Cheyenne everywhere. Especially instruct troops in upper Arkansas.

S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

Ft. Leavenworth, October 7, 1864.
Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff:

General Blunt came upon a party of Arapaho and other hostile Indians supposed to be four thousand, with fifteen hundred warriors, on the twenty-fifth ultimo. This was about one hundred miles west of Lamed on Pawnee fork. The Indians overpowered the advance, but the main force coming up routed and pursued them. Ninety-one dead Indians were left and we lost two killed and seven wounded. General Blunt's force was less than five hundred. He pursued for several days.

S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.

The place where this battle occurred was about one hundred and thirty miles east of the Sand Creek battle-ground, and probably some of the same Indians were in both encounters.

The telegrams I have quoted indicate that General Curtis was fully alive to the situation. Evidently he believed the Cheyenne and Arapaho were hostile and was not in favor of making peace with them until they had been punished.

On account of his limited force, Colonel Chivington could do little more than protect the lines of travel; consequently, all that summer and fall the frontier settlers were compelled to take care of themselves. And it was not until after the Third Colorado had been organized and equipped that he was able to strike a decisive blow. In his deposition presented at the investigation by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, among other things, Colonel Chivington has the following to say concerning the battle of Sand Creek and the conditions leading up to it.

"On the 29th day of November, 1864, the troops under my command attacked a camp of Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians at a place known as Big Bend of Sandy, about forty miles north of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory. There were in my command at that time about (500) five hundred men of the Third Regiment Colorado cavalry, under the immediate command of Colonel George L. Shoup, of said Third Regiment, and about (250) two hundred and fifty men of the First Colorado cavalry; Major Scott J. Anthony commanded one battalion of said First regiment, and Lieutenant Luther Wilson commanded another battalion of said First regiment.

The Third regiment was armed with rifled muskets, and Star's and Sharp's carbines. A few of the men of that regiment had revolvers. The men of the First regiment were armed with Star's and Sharp's carbines, and revolvers. The men of the Third regiment were poorly equipped; the supply of blankets, boots, hats, and caps was deficient. The men of the First regiment were well equipped; all of these troops were mounted. 1 had four 12-pound mountain howitzers, manned by detachments from cavalry companies; they did not belong to any battery company.

"From the best and most reliable information I could obtain, there were in the Indian camp, at the time of the attack, about eleven or twelve hundred Indians; of these about seven hundred were warriors and the remainder were women and children I am not aware that there were any old men among them. There was an unusual number of males among them, for the reason that the war chiefs of both nations were assembled there, evidently for some special purpose."

"What number did you lose in killed, and what number in wounded and what number in missing?"

"There were seven men killed, forty-seven wounded, and one was missing.

"From the best information I could obtain, I judge that there were five or six hundred Indians killed; I cannot state positively the number killed, nor can I state positively the number of women and children killed.

Officers who passed over the field, by my orders, report that they saw but few women and children dead, no more than would certainly fall in an attack upon a camp in which they were. I myself passed over some portions of the field after the fight, and I saw but one woman who had been killed, and one who had hanged herself; I saw no dead children. From all I could learn, I arrived at the conclusion that but few women or children had been slain. I am of the opinion that when the attack was made on the Indian camp the greater number of squaws and children made their escape, while the warriors remained to fight my troops.

"I do not know that any Indians were wounded that were not killed; if there were any wounded, I do not think they could have been made prisoners without endangering the lives of the soldiers; Indians usually fight as long as they have strength to resist. Eight Indians fell into the hands of the troops alive, to my knowledge; these with one exception were sent to Fort Lyon and properly cared for.

"My reason for making the attack on the Indian camp was that I believed the Indians in the camp were hostile to the whites That they were of the same tribes with those who had murdered many persons and destroyed much valuable property on the Platte and Arkansas rivers during the previous spring, summer, and fall was beyond a doubt. When a tribe of Indians is at war with the whites, it is impossible to determine what party or band of the tribe or the name of the Indian or Indians belonging to the tribe so at war, are guilty of the acts of hostility. The most that can be ascertained is that Indians of the tribe have performed the acts. During the spring, summer, and fall of the year 1864, the Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians, in some instances assisted or led on by Sioux, Kiowa, Comanche, and Apaches, had committed many acts of hostility in the country lying between the Little Blue and the Rocky Mountains and the Platte and Arkansas rivers. They had murdered many of the whites and taken others prisoners, and had destroyed valuable property, probably amounting to $200,000 or $300,000. Their rendezvous was on the headwaters of the Republican, probably one hundred miles from where the Indian camp was located. I had every reason to believe that these Indians were either directly or indirectly concerned in the outrages that had been committed upon the whites. I had no means of ascertaining what were the names of the Indians who had committed these outrages other than the declarations of the Indians themselves; and the character of Indians in the western country for truth and veracity, like their respect for the chastity of women who may be-come prisoners in their hands, is not of that order which is calculated to inspire confidence in what they may say. In this view I was supported by Major Anthony, 1st Colorado Cavalry, commanding at Fort Lyon, and Samuel G. Colley, United States Indian Agent, who, as they had been in communication with these Indians, were more competent to judge of their disposition toward the whites than myself. Previous to the battle they expressed to me the opinion that the Indians should be punished. We found in the camp the scalps of nineteen white persons. One of the surgeons informed me that one of these scalps had been taken from the victim's head not more than four days previously. I can furnish a child captured at camp ornamented with six white women's scalps. These scalps must have been taken by these Indians or furnished to them for their gratification and amusement by some of their brethren, who, like themselves, were in amity with the whites.

I had no reason to believe that Black Kettle and the Indians with him were in good faith at peace with the whites. The day before the attack Major Scott J. Anthony, 1st Colorado Cavalry, then commander at Fort Lyon, told me that these Indians were hostile; that he had ordered his sentinels to fire on them if they attempted to come into the post, and that the sentinels had fired on them; that he was apprehensive of an attack from these Indians and had taken every precaution to prevent a surprise. Major Samuel G. Colley, United States Indian Agent for these Indians, told me on the same day that he had done everything in his power to make them behave themselves, and that for the last six months he could do nothing with them; that nothing but a sound whipping would bring a lasting peace with them. These statements were made to me in the presence of the officers of my staff whose statements can be obtained to corroborate the foregoing.

"Since August, 1863, I had been in possession of the most conclusive evidence of the alliance, for the purposes of hostility against the whites, of the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, Kiowa and Apache Indians.

"Their plan was to interrupt, or, if possible, entirely prevent all travel on the routes along the Arkansas and Platte rivers, from the states to the Rocky Mountains, and thereby depopulate this country.

"With very flew troops at my command, I could do little to protect the settlers, except to collect the latest intelligence from the Indians' country, communicate it to General Curtis, commanding department of Missouri, and warn the settlers of the relations existing between the Indians and the whites, and the probability of trouble, all of which I did.

Commanding only a district with very few troops under my control, with hundreds of miles between my headquarters and the rendezvous of the Indians, with a large portion of the Santa Fe and Platte routes, besides the sparsely settled and distant settlements of this Territory to protect, I could not do anything till the 3rd regiment was organized and equipped, when I determined to strike a blow against this savage and determined foe. When I reached Fort Lyon, after passing over from three to five feet of snow, and greatly suffering from the intensity of the cold, the thermometer ranging from 28 to 30 degrees below zero, I questioned Major Anthony in regard to the whereabouts of hostile Indians. He said there was a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho about fifty miles distant; that he would have attacked before, but did not consider his force sufficient; that these Indians had threatened to attack the post, etc., and ought to be whipped, all of which was concurred in by Major Colley, Indian agent for the district of the Arkansas, which information with the positive orders of Major-General Curtis, commanding the department, to punish these Indians, decided my course, and resulted in the battle of Sand Creek, which has created such a sensation in Congress through the lying reports of interested and malicious parties.

"On my arrival at Fort Lyon, in all my conversations with Major Anthony, commanding the post, and Major Colley, Indian Agent, I heard nothing of this recent statement that the Indians were under the protection of the government, etc., but Major Anthony repeatedly stated to me that he had at different times fired upon these Indians, and that they were hostile, and, during my stay at Fort Lyon, urged the necessity of my immediately attacking the Indians before they could learn of the number of troops at Fort Lyon, and so desirous was Major Colley, Indian agent, that I should find and also attack the Arapaho, that he sent a messenger after the fight at Sand Creek nearly forty miles to inform me where I could find the Arapaho and Kiowa; yet, strange to say, I have learned recently that these men, Anthony and Colley, are the most bitter in their denunciations of the attack upon the Indians at Sand Creek. Therefore, I would, in conclusion, most respectfully demand, as an act of justice to myself and the brave men whom I have had the honor to command in one of the hardest campaigns ever made in this country, whether against white men or red, that we be allowed the right guaranteed to every American citizen, of introducing evidence in our behalf to sustain us in what we believe to have been an act of duty to ourselves and to civilization."

Colonel George L. Shoup, in a deposition presented to the military commission investigating the battle of Sand Creek, among other things, says:

On or about the 12th of November, 1864, I left Denver for Fort Lyon, with Companies C, D, and F of my regiment and Company H of the First Colorado Cavalry, and on or about the 18th of November joined Major Sayre at Boonville with that portion of the regiment which had been left at Bijou Basin (he having been ordered to precede me), consisting of Companies A, B, and E, and I and M. On or about the 20th Captain Baxter joined the command with Company G, and the day following Colonel John M. Chivington, commander of the district of Colorado, arrived and assumed command of the column, I still commanding my regiment. On or about the 22d the column, consisting of my regiment and a battalion of the first, marched from Boonville towards Fort Lyon and reached Fort Lyon on the 28th, and went into camp. On the evening of the 28th I received orders from the colonel commanding to prepare three days' cooked rations, and be ready to march at eight o'clock the same evening. At eight o'clock the column marched in the following order: the first regiment on the right, my regiment on the left. I had under my immediate command between five hundred and fifty and six hundred men mounted. My transportation was left at Fort Lyon. The column marched all night in a northerly direction. About daylight the next morning came in sight of an Indian village. Colonel Chivington and myself being about three-fourths of a mile in advance of the column, it was determined to make an immediate attack. Lieutenant Wilson, commanding a battalion of the first, was ordered to cut off the ponies of the Indians at the northeast of the village. By order of Colonel Chivington, I was ordered to send men to the southwest of the village, to cut off the ponies in that direction, and then to immediately engage the Indians.

"Did Colonel Chivington make any remarks to the troops, in your hearing?"

"He did not."

"Did you approach the camp of the Indians in line of battle with your men mounted, or dismounted?"

"Kept my men in columns of fours till I arrived at the village, when I formed them in line of battle, and to the left of a battalion of the first, commanded by Lieutenant Wilson, my men mounted."

"At what distance was your command from the village when you commenced fire upon it?"

"I did not allow my men to fire when I formed my first line; the battalion on my right was firing. I wheeled my men into columns of fours and marched to the rear of the battalion on my right, to the right of that battalion, to obtain a better position. I marched up Sand Creek some distance, following the Indians who were retreating up the creek. When opposite the main body of Indians, wheeled my men into line, dismounted, and opened fire."

"Did you know what band of Indians it was at the time of the attack?"

"I heard while at Fort Lyon that Left Hand, of the Arapaho, and Black Kettle, of the Cheyenne, were at the village."

"Did you, at any time prior to the attack, hear Colonel Chivington say that he was going to attack Black Kettle's band?"

"I did not."

"How long did the fight last?"

"The fighting did not entirely cease until about three o'clock in the afternoon."

"Did you camp with your regiment near the battle-ground?"

"We camped on ground occupied by the Indians before the battle."

"What was done with the Indians and other property?"

"The lodges were burned. The ponies, numbering, as I was told, five hundred and four, were placed in charge of the provost marshal. A few remained in the hands of the troops."

"What were the casualties of your regiment?" "Ten killed, one missing, about forty wounded." "In your opinion how many Indians were killed?" "From my 'own observation I should say about three hundred.

"Were they men, or women and children?"

"Some of each."

"Did you witness any scalping or other mutilation of the dead by your command?"

"I saw one or two men who were in the act of scalping, but I am not positive."

"Were you present in council with some Indian chiefs in Denver, some time last simmer or fall?"

"I was."

"Who were present whites and Indians?"

"Governor Evans, Colonel Chivington, Captain S. M. Robbins, Major Wynkoop, Major Whiteley, Amos Steck, J. Bright Smith, Nelson Sargent, Captain John Wanless, Black Kettle, White Antelope, and five or six other Indians, and John Smith and Sam Ashcroft, interpreters."

"Did the Indians express a desire for peace with the whites?"

"Yes."

"Upon what terms did they desire peace?"

"That they have protection and supplies while the war was carried on against hostile Indians."

"Was peace guaranteed to them on any terms?"

"They were told by Colonel Chivington that if they would come in and surrender themselves, he would then tell them what to do."

"What did the governor tell them?"

"That as they had violated all treaties they would have to treat with the military authorities, to whom he had given up all the authority."

"Did Colonel Chivington tell them that he would guarantee them peace only on condition that they would come into the post and lay down their arms?"

"Colonel Chivington did not guarantee them peace upon any terms, but if they would come into the post, surrender themselves, and lay down their arms, he would tell them what to do."

"Did the Indians say that they would do so?" "They said that they would go back to their people, tell them and advise them to do so."

"Did you have any conversation with Major Colley, Indian agent for the Arapaho and Cheyenne of the Upper Arkansas, respecting the disposition of the Indians and the policy that ought to be pursued towards them? If so, state what he said."

"I had an interview with Major Colley, on the evening of the 28th of November, in which he stated to me that these Indians had violated their treaty; that there were a few Indians that he would not like to see punished, but as long as they affiliated with the hostile Indians we could not discriminate; that no treaty could be made that would be lasting till they were all severely chastised; he also told me where these Indians were camped."

"State what you heard Major Scott J. Anthony say in reference to these Indians on the 28th of November last."

"He said he would have fought these Indians before if he had had a force strong enough to do so, and left a sufficient garrison at Fort Lyon, he being at the time in command of Fort Lyon."

The Hon. S. H. Elbert, Acting Governor of Colorado, in a message to the Legislature, a few months after the affair, reflects the general attitude of the people toward the battle, and those participating in it. The following is an extract from it:

The before unbroken peace of our Territory has been disturbed since the last spring, by an Indian war. Allied and hostile tribes have attacked our frontier settlements, driven in our settlers, destroyed their homes, attacked, burned, and plundered our freight and emigrant trains, and thus suspended agricultural pursuits in portions of our country, and interrupted our trade and commerce with the States. This has for the time seriously retarded the prosperity of our Territory.

Notes About the Book:

Source: The Indians of the Pike's Peak Region, Irving Howbert, Knickerbock Press, New York, 1914

Online Publication: The manuscript was scanned and then ocr'd. Minimal editing has been done, and readers can and should expect some errors in the textual output.  

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