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Legal Status of Indians, 1890
Many of the North American Indians in 1890 present a lamentable condition.
They are natives but they are not citizens, and have no defined status.
In the matter of civil rights the legal status of the North American reservation
Indian in 1890 is unstable. A United States district court has said that he is a
person within the constitution of the United States. The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs says he is a ward of the nation. The allotment act of 1884 says that
when allotted he at once becomes a citizen, that is, he is not a citizen until
he becomes the occupancy owner of lands held by a suspended fee.
After the government of the United States was organized the Indian was looked
upon as a subject, still not a citizen. When the superintendency and agency
system combined was in operation the Indians were still considered independent
nations until after the adoption of the reservation system, and, until 1871,
when President Grant ceased to treat with them as nations.
How Indians Born In The
United States May Become
Citizens.
In 1800 there were 3 ways in which an
Indian born in the United States could
become a citizen of the United States:
First. By taking an Indian homestead,
under provisions of the act of July 4, 1884
(23 United States Statutes, page 90), and
adopting the ways of civilized life. The
fees for the entry are paid by the nation if
the Indian is unable to pay them. The patent
for this homestead is issued after 25 years.
If the Indian is a citizen at the time of
his application for homestead he takes the
homestead as do other citizens, in fee.
Second. By reason of allotment to a
specific tract of land under law of Congress
of February 8, 1887 (24 United States
Statutes, page 388).
Third. By renouncing his tribal
relations and adopting the ways of civilized
life.
In the Oklahoma act of May 2, 1890, there is
a special provision for the Indians of
Indian Territory.
The United States district court for the
western district of New York decided in
1877, in the case of Abram Elm, indicted for
voting for a representative in Congress at
the election in the town of Lenox, Madison
County, in 1876, "that inasmuch as the
defendant was subject by the laws of the
United States to taxation and to the
jurisdiction of the courts in the same
manner and to the same extent as other
citizens", and since the tribal government
to which he belonged had ceased to exist, he
was entitled to vote, and his conviction for
illegal voting was reversed. From this
opinion by Judge Wallace it appeared that
whenever the tribal government of the
several Indian nations is broken, no further
action will be necessary to make the former
members citizens. The opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Elk v. Wilkins
necessitated new law as to this. The general
allotment act of February 8, 1887, followed
the suggestions in that case and provided
that-
Every Indian born within the territorial
limits of the United States who has
voluntarily taken up within said limits his
residence separate and apart from any tribe
of Indians therein, and has adopted the
habits of civilized life, is hereby declared
td he a citizen of the United States, and is
entitled to all the rights, privileges, and
immunities of such citizens, whether said
Indian has been or not, by birth or
otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians
within the territorial limits of the United.
States, without in any manner impairing or
otherwise affecting the right of any such
Indian to tribal or other property.
Congress can at any time by an act declare
all Indians in the United States, including
the Six Nations of New York and The Five
Civilized Tribes, citizens of the United
States. The Indians not citizens now are the
unallotted reservation Indians, the Six
Nations of New York, and The Five Civilized
Tribes of Indian territory.
Alien born Indians, become citizens as do
other aliens, and a state can admit an
Indian to citizenship, but not while be is
on a reservation or a ward of the nation.
The reservations and the Indians on them are
absolutely under the authority of the United
States.
The civil status of the Indians has been
defined by a long series of statutes and
court rulings. In the cases of the Cherokee
Nation .v. Georgia (5 Peters, 1) and
Worcester v. Georgia (6 Peters, 515) the
Indian tribes residing within the United
States were recognized in some sense as
political bodies, not as foreign nations nor
as domestic nations, but still possessing
and exercising some of the functions of
nationality; but by act of Congress of March
3, 1871, it was provided that hereafter no
recognition by treaty or otherwise should be
made by the United States of the claim of
any Indian tribe as being an independent
nation, tribe, or power. The Indians hold
the relation of wards to the general
government and are subject to its control. A
state legislature has no jurisdiction over
the Indian territory contained within the
territorial limits of the state; but in the
case of New York v. Dibble (21 Howard, 366)
it was decided that the state holds the
sovereign police authority over the persons
and property of the Indians, so far as
necessary to preserve the peace and protect
them from imposition and intrusion.
Indian includes descendants of Indians who
have an admixture of white or Negro blood,
provided they retain their distinctive
character as members of the tribe from which
they trace descent.(a)
The United States adopted the principle
originally established by European nations,
that the aboriginal tribes were to be
regarded as the owners of the territories
they respectively occupied.(b)
Indians who maintain their tribal
relations are the subjects of independent
governments, and as such not in the
jurisdiction of the United. States, because
the Indian nations have always been regarded
as distinct political communities between
which and the government certain
international relations were to be
maintained. These relations are established
by treaties to the same extent as with
foreign powers. They are treated as
sovereign communities, possessing and
exercising the right of free deliberation
and action, but, in consideration of
protection, owing a qualified subjection to
the United States.(c)
If the tribal organization of Indian
bands is recognized by the national
government as existing; that is to say, if
the government makes treaties 'with and has
its agent among them, paying annuities, and
dealing otherwise with "headmen" in its
behalf, the' fact that the primitive habits
and customs of the tribe have been largely
broken into by intercourse with the whites
does not authorize a state government to
regard the tribal organization as gone and
the Indians as citizens of the state where
they are and subject to its laws.(d)
When members leave their tribe and become
merged into the mass of the people they owe
complete allegiance to the government of the
United States and are subject to its
courts.(e)
A white man who is incorporated with a
tribe by adoption does not thereby become an
Indian so as to cease to be amenable to the
laws of the United States or to lose the
right to trial in their courts.(f)
Under the constitution "Indians not
taxed" are not counted in apportioning
representatives and direct taxes among the
states; and Congress has power to regulate
commerce with the Indian. tribes. The tribes
are alien nations, distinct political
communities, with whom the United States
have habitually dealt either through
treaties or acts of Congress. The members
owe immediate allegiance to their several
tribes, and are not part of the people of
the United States. They are in a dependent
condition, a state of pupilage, resembling
that of a ward to his guardian. Indians and
their property, exempt from taxation by
treaty or statute of the United States, can
not be taxed by any state. General acts of
Congress do not apply to Indians, unless so
expressed as to clearly manifest an
intention to include them. The alien and
dependent condition of the members of the
tribes can not be put off at their own will
without the assent of the United States.
They have never been deemed citizens, except
under explicit provisions of treaty or
statute to that effect; nor were they made
citizens by the fourteenth amendment.(g).
While the government has recognized in
the Indian tribes heretofore a state of
semi-independence and pupilage, it has the
right and authority, instead of controlling
them by treaties, to govern them by acts of
Congress, they being within the geographical
limits of the United States, and necessarily
subject to the o laws which Congress may
enact for their protection and that of the
people with whom they come in contact. A
state has no power over them as long as they
maintain their tribal relations. The Indians
then owe no allegiance to the state and
receive from it no protection.(h)
In construing a treaty, if words be used
which are susceptible of a more extended
meaning than their plain import as connected
with the tenor of the treaty, they should be
considered as used in the latter sense. How
the words were understood by the unlettered
people, rather than their critical meaning,
should form the rule of construction.(i)
The relations between the United States
and the different tribes being those of a
superior toward inferiors' . who are under
its care and control, its acts touching them
and its promises to them in the execution of
its: own policy and in the furtherance of
its own interests are to be interpreted as
justice and reason demand in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to
whom are due its care and protection. The
inequality between the parties is to be made
good by the superior justice which looks
only to the substance of the right, without
regard to technical rules framed under a
system of municipal jurisprudence
formulating the rights and obligations of
private persons equally subject to the same
laws. A treaty is not to be read as rigidly
as a document between private persons
governed by a system of technical law, but
in the light of that larger reason which
constitutes the spirit of the law of
nations. (j)
Regulation Of Commerce
With Indian Tribes.
Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the
constitution of the United States says that
the Congress shall have power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states, and, with the Indian
tribes". Commerce "with the Indian tribes"
applies only to cases where the tribe is
wholly within the limits of a state. (k)
Expatriation.
The right of expatriation is inalienable
and extends to individuals of the Indian
race. (l)
Laws As To Indian
Tribes And Marital Relations.
No state laws have any force over Indians
in their tribal relations: Kansas Indians,
72 U. S., 5 Wall., 737 (18 L. ed., 667); New
York Indians, 72 U. S., 5 Wall., 761 (18 L.
ed., 708); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.
S., 375 (30 L. ed., 228); United States v.
Holiday, 70 U. S., 3 Wall., 407 (18 L. ed.,
182); United States v. Shanks, 15 Minn., 369
(Gil., 302.); Dole v. Irish, 2 Barb,, 639;
Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N.Y., 293; Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U. S., 5 Pet., 1 (8 L.
ed., 25); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S., 6
Pet., 515 (8 L. ed., 483); Wall v.
Williamson, 8 Ala,, 48; Wall v. Williams, 11
Ala., 826; Morgan v. McGhee, 5 Humph., 13;
Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo., 72; Boyer v.
Dively, 58.Mo., 510; Tuten v. Byrd, 1 Swan,
108; Jones v. Laney, 2 Tex., 342.
The civil laws of the state do not extend to
an Indian country within a state (United
States v. Shanks, 15 Mimi., 369) nor to
Indians maintaining tribal relations (United
States v. Payne, 4 Dill., 389).
Indian
Descent
The rules of Indian descent are: Partus
(L.): that which is brought forth, or born;
offspring, young. Partus sequitur patrem:
the offspring follows the father; the
condition of the father. Partus sequitur
ventrem: the offspring follows the mother.
Partus: the former rule prevails in
determining the status of children born of a
mother who is a citizen of the United States
or of an Indian living with his people in a
tribal relation, This was the principle of
the Roman and of the common law with regard
to the children of freemen; but in the case
of animals the second maxim still obtains:
the owner of the female, owns her progeny,
whether brood, foal, or litter. Formerly,
also, in the southern states, the children
of Negroes took the mother's condition. (m)
The supreme court of Minnesota, January 17,
1890, in the case of Esther Earl at al. v.
Eugene M. Wilson et al., appellants, held
that "an Indian tribe within the state,
recognized as such by the United States
government, is to be considered as a
separate community or people, capable of
managing its own affairs, including the
domestic relations, and those persons
belonging to the tribe who are recognized by
the custom and laws of the tribe as married
persons must be so treated by the courts,
and the children of such marriages can not
be regarded as illegitimate. (Kansas
Indians, 72 U. S., 5 Wall., 737 (18 L. ed.,
667); Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Company, 76
Mich., 498, and cases cited; Boyer v. Dively,
58 Mo., 510; Sutton v. Warren, 10 Met.,
452.)
A marriage according to the custom of an
Indian tribe need not be contracted in the
territory of that tribe in order to be
valid. (La Riviere v. La Riviere, 97 Mo.,
80.) Indians within a state are not citizens
or members of the body politic, but are
considered as independent tribes governed by
their own laws and usages. (Holden v. Joy,
84 IL S., 17 Wall., 211 (21 L. ed., 523);
Goodell v. Jackson, 7 Johns., 290; Strong v.
Waterman, 11 Paige.)
Individual Liability of Tribal Indians
Indians in tribal relations, as well as
allottees, can make personal debts, their
liability for such legal debts being subject
to the following rules:
1. An Indian is not incapable of giving a
valid promissory note by reason of the fact
that he belongs to a band which is governed
by ancient Indian customs and retains a
tribal organization, unless it grows out of
sonic contract prohibited by law.
2, The fact that the lands of a defendant,
who is an Indian, are not liable to levy and
sale under a judgment is no ground for
refusing a judgment against him.
3. Rendering judgment for a sum in excess of
that covered by the prayer of the complaint
is not ground for reversal where it does not
exceed the amount due, as the complaint
might have been amended if the objection had
been made in the lower court. (Ke-tuc-e-mun-guah,
appellant, v. Samuel McClure, Indian.)
The assignment of errors calls in
question the correctness of the ruling of
the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer
to these answers, as well as the propriety
of the ruling in overruling a Motion for a
new trial. It is earnestly contended by the
appellant that the band of Indians of which
he is a member is the ward of the United
States government, and that by reason
thereof each member of said band is under
legal disability, and is incapable of making
a binding contract. It is admitted by the
appellee, as we understand his brief, that
the band to Which the appellant belongs is,
in a sense, the ward of the government of
the United States; but it is denied that any
law exists creating a general legal
disability, and that the individual members
of said band are not prohibited from
contracting debts and making such contracts
as the one now in suit. As all persons not
under legal disabilities are capable of
making and entering into binding contracts,
it follows that the note in suit is a
binding obligation, unless it can be shown
that the making of such note was prohibited
by some law or contrary to the public
policy. In support of his contention the
appellant cites the cases of Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U. S., 5 Pet., 1 (S L. ed.,
25); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S., 6 Pet.,
515 (8 L. ed., 483), and Goodell v. Jackson,
20 Johns:, 693.
While it was held in the case of Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia that the Cherokee Nation
was a separate state, a, distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of
managing its own affairs and governing
itself, it was held also that it was not a
foreign state in the sense of the
constitution of the United States, and could
not maintain an action as such in the courts
of the United States.
The case of Worcester v. Georgia was a
prosecution against Worcester, a white
missionary, who resided within the territory
reserved, by treaty with the government of
the United States, to the Cherokee Nation.
The prosecution was instituted under a, law
of the state of Georgia making it a penal
offense to reside in that territory without
a license from the governor of the state. It
was held that the Cherokee Nation was a
distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of the state of
Georgia could have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia had no right to enter,
except with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves or in conformity with the
treaties and with the acts of Congress, as
the whole intercourse with that nation was,
by the constitution and laws, vested in the
United States.
While the chancellor in the case of Goodell
v. Jackson, 20 Johns, gives a comprehensive
review of the acts of Congress relating to
the various tribes of Indians and the
treaties made with them, and reaches the
Conclusion that they are to be regarded as
separate and distinct nations, subject,
however, to the protection of the general
government, the case depended wholly upon
the statutes of the state of New York, and
the questions there adjudicated can have no
bearing upon the question for determination.
Indeed, there would seem to be no doubt that
the different Indian tribes residing within
the territory of the United States, while
they keep up their tribal relations, are to
be regarded, in the absence of some act of
Congress upon the subject, as separate and
distinct nations. The government has always
treated with them as such, and, when engaged
in war against the whites, they have never
been treated as rebels, subject to the law
of treason, but, on the contrary, have
always been regarded and treated as separate
and independent nations, entitled to the
rights of ordinary belligerents, and subject
to no other penalties. Acting upon the
theory that the Indians, maintaining their
tribal relations: residing on reservations
secured to them by treaties with the United
States government, constitute separate and
distinct nations, and following the law as
announced in the ease of Worcester v.
Georgia, it was held by this court, in the
case of Me-shing-go-me-sia v. State, 36
Lid., 310, that this state had no power to
tax the lands reserved to the tribe to which
the appellant belongs. But none of these
cases decide that an Indian belonging to a
tribe or nation has not the power to make a
contract of the kind now before us, and our
attention has not been called to any law
which prohibits him from making such
contract. Very many of the acts of Congress,
as well as the adjudicated cases, proceed
upon the theory that an Indian may bind
himself by an ordinary executory contract
debt. Most, if not all, 9f the acts of
Congress granting annuities to the Indians
provide that such Indians shall not be bound
by any contract whereby such annuity is
disposed of or pledged before the same is
actually paid by the government.
By the Revised Statutes of the United
States, 1878, page 367, it is provided that
no agreement shall be made by any person
with any individual Indian, not a citizen of
the United States, for the payment or
delivery of any money, or other thing of
value, in present or prospective,, or for
the granting or procuring any privilege to
him or any other person, in consideration of
services for said Indians relative to their
lands, or to any claim growing out of, or
'in reference to, annuities, installments,
or other Moneys, claims, demands, or things,
under laws or treaties with the United
States, or official acts of any officers
thereof, or in any way connected with or due
from the United States, unless such
contractor agreement be executed and
approved as therein provided. It does not
appear that the contract in suit MS within
the class of contracts prohibited by this
act of Congress; Unless it appears that such
contract falls within the provisions of this
statute, or some other statute, rendering it
illegal, it must be held to be valid and
binding. (Godfrey v. Scott, 70 Ind., 259.)
a. Wall v. Williams, 11
Ala., 836 (1847). See Relation of Indians to
Citizenship, 7 Op. Att. Gon" 746-750 (1856);
Campan v. Dewey, 9 Mich., 435 (1861).
b. United States v. Rogers,
4 How., 567 (1846); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8
Wheat, 574-584 (1823); United States v,
Kagama, 118 U. S., 881-382 (1886); 3 Kent,
378; Washb., R. P,, 521,
c. Ex parte Reynolds, 18
Alb. Law J., 8 (D. S. D. C., W. D. Ark.,
1878), Parker, J. See also Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 5 Pet., 16 (1831); Worcester v
Georgia, 6 id., 515-584 (1832); Dred Scott
v, Sandford, 19 How" 403 (1856); Cherokee
Trust Funds, 117 U. S., 288 (1886); 2 Story
Collat., pages 1097-1100, 3 Kent, 808-318;
50 Mich., 585.
d. The Kansas Indians, 5
Wall., 737-756 (1866), Davis, J.
e. Ex parte Reynolds, 18
Alb, Law J., 8 (U. S. D. C., W. D. Ark.,
1878), Parker, J.
f. United States v. Rogers,
4 How., 507 (1M); 2 Op. AU, Gen., 693; 4
id., 258; 7 id., 174,
g. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.
S., 99,100-102 (1884), cases, Gray, J.
h. United Statue v. Kagama,
118 U. S., 375.381,882 (1886), cases,
Miller, J.; act March 3, 1871; R. S.,
section 2079; 119 U. S., 27.
i. Worcester v. Georgia, 6
Pet., 582 (1832), McLean, J.
j. Choctaw Nation Y. United
States, 119 17. S., 28 (1886), Matthews, On
Indian Citizenship, sec 20 Am. Law Rev.,
183-193 (1886), cases.
k. United States v.
Holliday, 3 Wall., 17, 418 (1686) United
States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whisky, 108
17, S., 484 (1883).
l. United States ex rel.
Standing Bear v. Crook, 6 Dill., 453 (1879).
m. See, generally, 2 Bl. Com., 390; as to
Indians, United. States v, Sanders, 1 Hempst.,
486 (1847); Ex parte Reynolds, 5 Dill., 483
(1879); as to slaves, Andover v. Canton, 13
Mass., 551 (1816); Commonwealth v. Aves, 18
Pick., 222 (1830); William C. Anderson, in
"A Dictionary of Law ", 1881.
Condition of the Indian by State, 1890
Notes About the Book:
Source: Report on Indians Taxed and Indians not Taxed in the United States, Except
Alaska at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Department of the Interior, Government
Printing Office, Washington DC., 1894
A
Report to the Secretary of War of the United
States on Indian Affairs, by Rev. Jedidiah
Morse, 1822, Printed by S. Converse
Online Publication: The manuscript was scanned and
then ocr'd. Minimal editing has been done, and readers can and should expect
some errors in the textual output. Several spellings have been used for the same
tribe of Indians.
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stereotypes reflecting the culture or language of a particular period or place.
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Condition of the Indian by State, 1890
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