While we know our northern friends may not feel it, in the South, Spring is
here. So we thought we'd share a few of our gardening sites appropriate
for this time of the year. Along with gardening, there's grilling, and getting
ready to diet so that you can fit back into that bathing suit this summer!
In the night West was aroused from sleep
and informed that Mangas Coloradas had
attempted to escape and had been shot dead
by the guards. The accounts of the capture
and execution of this famous Apache are
confusing and contradictory. More than one
soldier who was present at the time has left
on record the assertion that the captive was
tormented and enraged beyond endurance, and
when forced to angry complaint, was shot. I
give West's own account of the event. He
says that he investigated the death of
Mangas Coloradas at once and found that he
had made three attempts to escape between
midnight, when he was placed under guard of
a sergeant and three privates, and one
o'clock when he was shot while, for the
third time, attempting to escape. It seems
too likely that General West had so deeply
impressed the guard with the common feeling
of himself and his command, that the rascal
deserved death, that the soldiers believed
they were carrying out the real desire of
the commanding officer with respect to him.
It is probable that the old chief was
improperly treated in order to arouse his
fury and give the guard an excuse for
shooting him.
When Shirland took Mangas Coloradas, it was
understood that the chief was to be
permitted to return to his people at a
certain time. The troops now marched to
Pinos Altos and upon arriving there were
approached by the followers of Mangas
Coloradas. They were attacked by order of
Captain McCleave, and eleven Indians were
killed and one wounded. This affair was on
January 19, 1863. The following day the
troops came upon an Indian ranchería, and in
a surprise attack killed nine of the
Indians, wounded many more, destroyed the
ranchería, and captured thirty-four
animals--some of them Government mules
previously stolen by the Indians. January
29, at Pinos Altos Mines, two hunting
parties of the California Volunteers were
attacked by the Apaches, and a sergeant and
a private were killed. The Indians were
driven off with severe punishment, losing
twenty killed and fifteen wounded.
February 22, 1863, McCleave moved with his
four companies to the site recommended for
Fort West. The post was occupied that
spring, but General West instructed McCleave
not to erect buildings until further orders.
On March 22 the Gila Apaches ran off sixty
head of horses from the grazing ground near
Fort West. Within three hours Captain
McCleave was in pursuit, with one hundred
poorly mounted men and five days' rations on
pack mules. The Indians had a good lead and
they made fast time. Their trail led in a
westerly direction. Following it for seventy
miles, McCleave found that it continued down
the Gila for five miles, and then across a
divide to the Black River. By the time
McCleave reached the Black River, the
soldiers had been in the saddle more than
three days, almost without sleep, and many
of the horses were giving out. Signs
indicated that they were now near the
marauders. In the twilight they moved
noiselessly up the stream two miles and made
camp in the darkness and rain. At eight the
next morning, just four days to an hour
after the chase began, thirty men under
Lieutenant Latimer, mounted on the only
horses that were still fit for service, and
thirty on foot led by McCleave started out
to find a ranchería which they were sure was
near by. Lieutenant French with the
remainder of the command stayed behind to
guard the broken-down horses, the pack
animals, and provisions. McCleave climbed a
mountain on the west side of the stream and
proceeded twelve miles, without success. He
then rested with his men in a heavy rain
from one o'clock until daybreak. When
daylight came, McCleave was able to make out
from an elevated position the ranchería for
which they were searching. Latimer was
ordered to go in advance and charge the
Indians with his cavalry. This was gallantly
done. Part of the dismounted men began at
once to catch and guard the stolen horses,
while the others, from the bluff, took part
in the battle. In twenty minutes the Indians
were routed and the ranchería destroyed.
Twenty-five were killed. All the Government
horses that could be found, as well as a
good many Indian horses, were secured.
Private James Hall was mortally wounded, and
on the return trip, when the soldiers were
attacked by the Indians from the walls of a
canyon, Lieutenant French was wounded. For
alacrity and endurance in pursuit and
bravery in attack, this expedition is
perhaps unsurpassed in the history of Apache
warfare.
In the Overland Monthly of September, 1870,
there is a vivid account of this campaign by
one who took part in it. Says the writer:
'Our sole sustenance, four days and nights,
had been hard bread and raw pork, with but
four hours' sleep during that time. . . .
Out of one hundred horses with which we
started, but thirty remained alive; and of
these, but fifteen were capable of further
service. . . . Most of the men had performed
two days' journey on foot, with all their
accoutrements."
There was, perhaps, no more completely
successful expedition against the Apaches
than that conducted by Thomas T. Tidball in
early May, 1863. It was difficult, indeed,
for an American officer to outwit and
outmarch a band of Apaches; but in this
instance the Indians were outdone both in
craft and celerity. It was known to Colonel
David Fergusson, in command at Tucson, that
there was a very hostile and cruel band of
Apaches who rendezvoused at a ranchería in
Arivaipa Canyon. May 2, 1863, Fergusson gave
Tidball orders to start that very night to
chastise these dangerous Indians. He was to
select twenty-five men from Companies I and
K of the Fifth Infantry California
Volunteers and was to be accompanied by ten
volunteer American citizens, thirty-two
Mexicans under Jesus Maria Elias, and about
twenty Papagos from San Xavier, commanded by
their brave and discreet governor, José
Antonio Saborze. Nine tame Apaches were also
to go along as guides. Tidball was to be in
full command of this mixed force. It was the
purpose to surprise the ranchería. They were
to kill as many warriors as possible, but
were to bring women and children back to
Tucson as captives.
The party traveled five nights in utter
silence, resting and concealing themselves
by day. Not a gun was fired; never was a
fire lighted. The ranchería was taken
completely unawares. The evening and night
before the battle, the company had traveled
sixteen hours over frightful precipices,
through gloomy canyons and chasms heretofore
untrod by white men. At dawn they fell upon
the encampment, numbering more than twice
their own force, killed more than fifty
Apaches and wounded as many, took ten
prisoners, and captured sixty-six head of
stock. Thomas C. McClelland was the only man
killed in the attacking party.
October 23, 1863, by a General Order,
Carleton created the new military District
of Northern Arizona. He did this because the
discovery of gold in the region of modern
Prescott was attracting many prospectors
from the Pacific Coast, Mexico, and the
East. Previous to 1863 there were no white
settlers in northern Arizona. But now
Carleton thought it necessary to place a
military force in this region to protect the
miners from the Apaches and to insure order
among the prospectors and adventurers until
a civil government should be organized. He
ordered the following officers and troops to
proceed to the new gold fields without
delay: Major Edward B. Willis of the
California Volunteers; Captain Herbert M.
Enos, U. S. Army; Dr. Charles Lieb,
acting-assistant surgeon; and Companies C
and F, First Infantry California Volunteers,
under Captains Hargrave and Benson; and
Captain Pishon, with thirty, rank and file,
of Company D, First Cavalry, California
Volunteers. A board of officers were named
to fix the site of a military post, to be
named Fort Whipple, and to submit a plan for
it. During the coming winter the troops were
to live in huts. The site first chosen was
about seventy miles south of the San
Francisco Mountains on Rio Verde. As soon as
the site of the territorial capital was
selected, Assistant-Inspector General N. H.
Davis and Governor Goodwin recommended that
the location of the post be changed; so, May
27, 1864, Major Willis wrote to Carleton to
inform him that the site for Fort Whipple
"is a mile and a half northeast from the
town now being built on Granite Creek [
Prescott]."
King Woolsey, Arizona's great Indian
fighter, had a famous encounter with the
Tonto Apaches in the early winter of 1864.
This affair has always been alluded to as
"The Massacre at Bloody Tanks" or "The
Pinole Treaty." During the winter of
1863-1864, the Indians had been very busy
running off the stock of the settlers in
Peeples' Valley and thereabout. In January
Woolsey led a company of the settlers
against these marauders. The official report
of the engagement is very brief: "On January
24, 1864, a party of thirty Americans and
fourteen Maricopa and Pima Indians, under
King S. Woolsey, aide to the Governor of
Arizona, attacked a band of Gila Apaches
sixty or seventy miles northeast of the Pima
Village and killed nineteen of them and
wounded others. Mr. Cyrus Lennon of
Woolsey's party was killed by a wounded
Indian."
But the account of the battle as it has come
down to us from Arizona pioneers is much
more detailed and colorful. First the party
struck into the Tonto Basin in pursuit of
their enemies. A few miles from the present
site of Miami, they found that they were
encircled by Indians on the hills above.
There was with Woolsey's party an
interpreter Jack, a young Yuma Indian who
had been a captive among the Apaches for a
time. He persuaded about thirty of the
leading Apaches to come down without arms
for a council. He told them that he and his
white friends were there to make peace and
bring gifts. Leaving the main body of his
men about two hundred feet in the rear, with
instructions to open fire on the Apaches
when he should give the signal by putting
his hand up to his hat, Woolsey went forward
with three others (each one with two
revolvers secreted under his coat) to hold
council with the chiefs. As they were seated
in a semicircle, so the story goes, an
Apache entered the group drawing two lances
at his heels, while another one appeared and
secretly distributed a handful of knives to
the Indians. Then came an Indian boy almost
out of breath to announce that the Big Chief
ordered them all to leave the conference, as
it was his intention to wipe out all the
whites and their Indian allies. Woolsey now
gave the prearranged signal, and at the same
time shot the chief seated at his side. The
others who were with him used their pistols
in like manner. The men at the rear, who
were armed with rifles, made havoc among the
Indians who had remained on the mountains.
So severe was the punishment administered to
the Tonto Apaches that they did not trouble
the settlers again for a long time. The
reason that this affair is always spoken of
as "The Pinole Treaty" is the fact that a
widespread report has persisted to the
effect that the gift of pinole that was
given to the Indians had been treated with
strychnine and that about forty Indians died
of poison. The writer does not give credence
to this sinister story.
No sooner was the Territorial Government set
up in 1864 than Governor John N. Goodwin
went to work to acquaint himself with the
wide wild domain over which he was to rule.
He visited the mining settlements that had
sprung up about Fort Whipple, traveled
eastward as far as the Verde and Salt
Rivers, and in March visited Tucson. From
Tucson, April 4, he wrote a long personal
letter to General Carleton at Santa Fe,
giving an account of his explorations and
making recommendations concerning military
protection for the settlers and the officers
of Government. Two weeks earlier than this,
AssistantInspector General N. H. Davis had
made a very lucid report to Carleton
concerning the same matters. He had
inspected Fort Whipple and had visited the
many locations recently settled and had then
joined Governor Goodwin on his journey
southward. All of the best-informed
prospectors and Indian fighters agreed with
Goodwin and Davis as to the necessity of
locating a strong permanent post east of the
Verde or at the junction of the Verde and
Salt Rivers.
Governor Goodwin said in his letter: "The
Indian difficulties are becoming very
serious, and unless vigorous measures are
taken, the new mining regions will be
deserted. I think that this is a very
critical period in the history of this
Territory. If the people who have come into
northern Arizona are driven out, the
settlement of the Territory will be retarded
for many years; but if the Indian
difficulties are speedily settled, a large
emigration will come in here during the next
year. The people here will do all in their
power. I think that three effective
companies of rangers can be raised for
service against the Indians, who will serve
without pay, requiring food only, and to
some extent ammunition."
Colonel Davis writes in his report to
Carleton: "I am satisfied, General, from
reliable information gained from a variety
of sources, and from the character and
disposition of the Indians in this
territory, who are, with few exceptions,
bitterly hostile to the whites and
apparently disposed to combine for a general
war against them [that our only true policy]
is to put forth every effort in a vigorous
and decisive campaign against the barbarous
tribes. . . . The condition of affairs here
must be looked in the face and the Indians
subdued and rendered harmless, or the
country deserted by whites, its mines and
agricultural resources undeveloped, and the
Territory given up to the savage and the
coyote.
"The advantages of a large and permanent
military post north of the Gila, east of the
Rio Verde or San Francisco, and perhaps
along the Salinas, are impressed upon my
mind more strongly than ever . . . if you
would give the heaviest blow to the Apache
Nation and best promote the interests of
Arizona."
General Carleton was moved to prompt action
by the recommendations of these two able
men, Goodwin and Davis. He set in motion at
once the best-planned and most far-reaching
campaign against the Apaches ever yet
inaugurated by the United States Government.
Within two weeks a comprehensive General
Order was issued that affected every
military unit in the department. The order
required that all Apache males capable of
bearing arms should either be removed to a
reservation or exterminated. A post was to
be established on the Gila north of Fort
Bowie, the site to be determined by Colonel
Davis, and the fort to be named for Governor
Goodwin. A combined force of five hundred
infantry and cavalry under Colonel Edwin A.
Rigg was to take post there. From this point
parties whose numbers were to be determined
by Colonel Rigg were to march in every
direction where the enemy could be found. On
scouts of seven days or less the soldiers
were to carry their food in their
haversacks. On longer scouts pack mules were
to furnish transportation. The rations on
these expeditions were to consist of meat,
bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, and nothing
more. Each soldier was to be allowed only
one blanket for bedding. "To be encumbered
with more is not to find Indians," wrote the
General.
At the same time that these operations were
in progress from Fort Goodwin, detachments
were to move northward from Tucson through
Cañada del Oro and on to the San Pedro; from
Fort Bowie, toward the south into the
Chiricahuas; from Fort Whipple,
southeastward toward the Salt River; from
Fort Canby, into the western Mogollons; from
Fort Wingate, toward the head of the Gila by
way of the Sierra Blanca Mountains; and from
Forts Craig and McRae westward to the head
waters of the Mimbres River and also to the
southward in the direction of Pinos Altos
and Cooke's Canyon. Parties were to scour
the country toward the south from Fort
Cummings and toward the north from the camp
on the Mimbres. These numerous expeditions
were all to take the field May 25 and were
to remain out two months if possible.
In addition to this formidable activity on
the part of the military, Governor Goodwin
was asked to have parties of miners in the
field at the same time; and it was arranged
to send out four bands of Pima and Maricopa
Indians, with fifty in each party, to smite
their ancient enemies. Moreover, notice of
these combined and simultaneous movements
was sent to the Governors of Sonora and
Chihuahua, with the warning that, when
hard-pressed, the Indians would cross into
Mexico, and with the request that these two
exposed states put companies of militia into
the field to cooperate with the Americans
against the common foe.
The General gave this parting counsel to his
troops: "Every party, in energy,
perseverance, resolution, and self-denial,
must strive to outdo all other parties.
Dependence must be placed on the gallantry
of small numbers against any odds. This
covering of so much ground by detachments of
determined men, moving simultaneously from
so many different points, must produce a
moral effect upon the Indians which it is
hoped will convince them of the folly long
to hold out against us." Surely such grim
and extensive preparations for the wholesale
destruction of their tribe must have made
even Apache devils tremble --if they
comprehended the scope and intensity of the
plan!
Now what came of all this masterly
preparation and wholehearted cooperation?
Very little--so far as either the
extermination of the fighting Apaches was
concerned or the location of them on
reservations. There was earnest effort on
the part of soldier, civilian, and Indian
allies. Energy, resolution, and military
skill were exhibited by both the officers
and men put into the field, but, somehow,
the Apaches were indisposed toward either
imprisonment on reservations or
extermination. The total results of the year
may be summed up as follows: Two hundred and
sixteen Indians were killed and a great
number wounded; seventy-five horses and
cattle, and one hundred and seventy-five
sheep, were recovered. But on the other hand
sixteen whites were killed and one hundred
and sixty-two horses and cattle, and three
thousand sheep were taken. Thirty Western
Apaches were placed on the reservation at
Bosque Redondo. The outcome was seen by all
to be a pitiful failure. It is true that the
whites had destroyed many acres of growing
crops that the Apaches were raising in the
fertile and sheltered little valleys; but,
as a result thereof, hatred of the whites
was increased and suspicion and lack of
confidence on both sides was more apparent
than ever.
The Apaches were too shrewd for the white
man, and their hiding places too rough and
remote for soldier or civilian to attack
with success. They were perfectly at home in
these canyons and mountain hideouts, and
every movement of the detachments that were
sent out against them was observed and
reported by their ever vigilant scouts. Time
and again the soldiers would come upon the
ranchería they had been hunting for so
diligently, and with such great hardship, to
find that it was deserted and no Indians in
sight. When they were successful in locating
a band of Indians, almost always the savages
would approach with a flag of truce desiring
to talk with the officer in command; but
usually there was such suspicion of bad
faith on both sides that these parties would
break up in a battle--the Indians, in almost
every instance, fading away and escaping
without much loss, but more than ever
determined never to yield to their pursuers.
In a few instances, however, whether by
virtue of extraordinary foresight, energy,
and military prowess, or by trickery and
treachery, the Indians were taken by
surprise and suffered heavy losses. Some of
the most successful of these scouts I here
describe in detail. On the fifteenth of
March, 1864, even before Carleton's order of
May 1, a large band of Indians, probably
Chiricahuas, ran off the Government herd
from Cow Springs. March 24 Colonel G. W.
Bowie ordered Captain Whitlock to pursue the
Apaches and punish them. Leaving the camp on
the Mimbres, March 27, Whitlock kept up the
chase until the morning of April 7. In his
command were thirty-five mounted men and
thirty-six on foot. Whitlock displayed great
judgment, as well as rare persistence and
resolution. Previous experience in Indians
had taught him that it was not wise to
follow directly the trail over which they
had stampeded stock. Whitlock, therefore,
followed the direct trail only about thirty
miles in order to determine its general
direction. When he had made sure of this he
turned north to the Gila so that his pursuit
could not be suspected. Five days he
traveled down the river, sending out a scout
the third day to find the trail of the
Indians again. It was found and it still
continued straight westward. After being out
nine days, always traveling by night and
never lighting fires, he made camp, and
leaving twenty men on guard, started with
the rest to intercept the trail and follow
it once more. Soon fresh tracks and other
signs indicated that the Indians were not
far away. March 7, at four A.M., the
campfires of the marauders were located.
This word was brought to Whitlock and his
command, ten miles in the rear, just at
dawn; but by rapid marching he was able to
reach the encampment and make the attack
just as the Indians were rousing from their
slumbers. Thirty Indians were killed, many
were wounded, and the stock was captured,
except two mules and one pony. Following so
soon after Captain Tidball's devastating
battle in Arivaipa Canyon, this victory was
most depressing to the Indians of that
region. The Army mules had been run by the
savages more than eighty miles without water
over rocky mountains and through canyons of
frightful character. The trail could have
been followed for the first thirty-five
miles by the dead carcasses of horses and
mules from which the fleshy parts had been
cut by the Indians. Whitlock on this
remarkable scout did not lose a man or an
animal.
Scarcely less brilliant than the expeditions
of Tidball and Whitlock was that of
Lieutenant Colonel N. H. Davis in May while
he was in search of a suitable location for
Fort Goodwin. After marching about ten miles
down the canyon of the Gila from the mouth
of the San Carlos, Davis made camp in an
arroyo a short distance from the river. He
heard that, across the high, stony Mescal
Mountains, there were some rancherías of
Indians. After a long night march he divided
his command, part under Captain Tidball and
part under Captain Burkett, and succeeded in
attacking the Indians at daybreak, and in
killing forty-nine and taking sixteen
captive. Two famous chiefs perished in this
battle--one, mortally wounded, thrust his
own spear into his body and so expired.
Fields of corn and wheat were destroyed and
much booty was recovered. It was evident
from articles found in the ranchería that it
was this band who had slain Messrs. Mills
and Stevens on the Santa Cruz in December,
1863, and had attacked Mr. Butterworth. One
pistol that was captured had Mill's name on
it and a shotgun was identified as the
property of Stevens. The Diary of Mr. James
was found, also. Among other articles
recovered were two saddles, two fine pairs
of saddlebags, and more than six hundred
dollars in gold.
In his message, delivered to the First
Legislative Assembly of Arizona at Prescott,
September 26, 1864, Governor Goodwin had
this to say about the Apaches: "But for
them, mines would be worked, innumerable
sheep and cattle would cover these plains,
and some of the bravest and most energetic
men that were ever the pioneers of a new
country, and who now fill bloody and
unmarked graves, would be living to see
their brightest anticipations realized. It
is useless to speculate on the origin of
this feeling, or inquire which party was in
the right or wrong. It is enough to know
that it is relentless and unchangeable. They
respect no flag of truce, ask and give no
quarter, and make a treaty only that, under
the guise of friendship, they may rob and
steal more extensively and with greater
impunity. As to them, one policy only can be
adopted. A war must be prosecuted until they
are compelled to submit and go upon a
reservation."
The Legislative Assembly drew up a Memorial
asking that Arizona be placed in the
Military Department of the Pacific and
submitted it to the Governor for his
approval, supporting the desirability of
this action (among other things) by the
charge that the campaign of 1864 against the
hostile Apaches was a failure. Governor
Goodwin refused to approve the Memorial but
in his communication to the Legislative
Assembly concerning it he implies that he,
too, considered the campaign a failure. He
writes: "The principal causes of the failure
of that campaign to accomplish its purposes
were ignorance of the country and the lack
of competent guides."
Bibliography
Arizona History. Elliott.
Bancroft Hubert H. History of Arizona and
New Mexico. San Francisco, 1889.
Dunn J. P. Massacre of the Mountains, A
History of the Indian Wars of the Far West.
New York, Harper, 1886.
Farish Thomas E. History of Arizona, Vol.
II. Phoenix, 1915.
Journals of the First Legislative Assembly
of the Territory of Arizona. Prescott, 1865.
Lockwood Frank C. Pioneer Days in Arizona.
New York, Macmillan, 1932.
Miscellaneous Documents of the House of
Representatives, 38th Congress, 2d Session.
Washington, 1865.
Pumpelly Raphael. Across America and Asia.
New York, Leypoldt and Holt, 1870.
The Overland Monthly. San Francisco, 1870.
War of the Rebellion. Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies. Prepared
under the direction of the Secretary of War,
by Bvt. LieutenantColonel Robert N. Scott.
Washington, 1880. Series I: Vols. I, IV, IX,
XV, XXVI. Part 1, XXVI; Part 2, XXX; Part 1,
XXXIV; Part 3, XLI, L; Part 1, L; Part 2.
This site
includes some historical materials that may imply negative stereotypes
reflecting the culture or language of a particular period or place. These
items are presented as part of the historical record and should not be
interpreted to mean that the WebMasters in any way endorse the stereotypes
implied .
