While we know our northern friends may not feel it, in the South, Spring is
here. So we thought we'd share a few of our gardening sites appropriate
for this time of the year. Along with gardening, there's grilling, and getting
ready to diet so that you can fit back into that bathing suit this summer!
The Civil War began April 12, 1861, with
the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, and
ended April 9, 1865, with Lee's surrender to
Grant. As has been set forth in the
preceding chapter, the Apache War broke out
in dead earnest a few weeks previous to the
fall of Fort Sumter, as a result of the dash
between Lieutenant Bascom and Cochise. A
fiery whirlwind, leaving death and
destruction in its wake, tore through the
white settlements of Arizona.
There were only two military posts in the
Gadsden Purchase at this time--Fort Buchanan
on the Sonoita. River, and Fort Breckenridge
at the junction of Arivaipa Canyon and the
San Pedro River. However, neither of these
establishments could properly be called a
fort. They were unfortified and it was as
much as the soldiers stationed there could
do to look after their own safety when the
Indians grew hostile. Raphael Pumpelly, a
man of keen observation and preeminent
courage and ability, who was in the Gadsden
Purchase at the time, writes: "Fort Buchanan
consisted simply of a few adobe houses,
scattered in a straggling manner over a
considerable area, and without a stockade
defense. The Apaches could, and frequently
did, prowl about the very doors of the
different houses. No officer thought of
going from one house to another at night
without holding himself in readiness with a
cocked pistol. During the subsequent
troubles with the Indians when the scattered
white population of the country was being
massacred on all sides for want of
protection the Government was bound to give,
the Commandant needed the whole force of 150
or 200 men to defend the United States
property. . . . But now," as Pumpelly points
out, "orders came from the abandonment of
the territory by the soldiers. The country
was thrown into consternation. The Apaches
began to ride through it roughshod,
succeeding in all their attacks. The
settlers, mostly farmers, abandoned their
crops, and with their families concentrated
for mutual protection at Tucson, Tubac, and
at one or two ranches." (Pumpelly Raphael.
Across Americans and Asia. New York,
Leypoldt & Holt, 1870.)
During the Civil War there was very little
actual fighting between the Union and
Confederate forces in Arizona and New
Mexico; yet the troops of both armies were
operating in these territories; and, in
consequence, the Apaches were now and then
caught between the upper and the nether
millstone, though never without cost to
soldier and white settler. As a matter of
fact, both Federal and Confederate troops
would have been glad to let the Apaches
alone for the time being, for they had their
hands full looking after each other. But the
Apaches never remained idle long. They had
to make their living; and, being no
respecters of persons, they robbed and
killed Rebel and Unionist indiscriminately.
Colonel E. R. S. Canby was appointed
Commander of the Department of New Mexico,
June 11, 1861. In July he reported that
Apache depredations were frequent in
Arizona. Two or three weeks later, in
August, he wrote that the southern part of
the Territory was in a very disturbed
condition on account of Apache hostilities;
and again on December 1, he reported
"increasing Indian hostilities . . .
Mescalero Apaches becoming more daring in
their moods." As for Lieutenant Colonel John
R. Baylor, Confederate Governor of Arizona
and Commander of Mounted Rifles, C.S.A., his
situation was still more annoying. Reporting
to his commanding general from Fort Bliss,
August 25, 1861, he wrote: "I regret to
inform you that Lieutenant Mays, with a
party of 14 men from Fort Davis, went in
pursuit of Indians and attacked a village of
Apaches, and after a desperate fight all
were killed except a Mexican, who came in
bringing the intelligence." September 24,
1861, Baylor reports that the Indians were
very troublesome and that he had not enough
troops to protect the citizens. However, on
the tenth of October in response to a
desperate call from unarmed miners at Pinos
Altos in danger of extermination from the
persistent attacks of the Gila Apaches, he
sent a detachment of one hundred men under
Major E. Waller to relieve the miners and
protect the rich mines.
Each commanding officer, whether Union or
Confederate, had his policy for suppressing
the savages. In December, 1861, Colonel
Canby wrote as follows to the Assistant
AdjutantGeneral of the United States Army:
"I have the honor to report that our
relations with the Indians in this
department are daily becoming more
unsatisfactory. . . . The policy of settling
them on reserves, removed from the Mexican
population, protecting and assisting them
until they are able to sustain themselves as
heretofore--repeatedly recommended by the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs and
commanders of this department--is, in my
judgment, the only policy that gives any
assurance of success. It is recommended by
considerations of humanity, economy, and
experience."
Colonel Baylor's method was more direct.
Writing from Mesilla, March 20, 1862, to
Captain Helm, in command of the Arizona
Guards, he issued this order: "I learn from
Lieutenant J. J. Jackson that Indians have
been in your post for the purpose of making
a treaty. The Congress of the Confederate
States has passed a law declaring
extermination to all hostile Indians. You
will therefore use all means to persuade the
Apaches or any tribe to come in for the
purpose of making peace, and when you get
them together kill all the grown Indians and
take the children prisoners and sell them to
defray the expense of killing the Indians.
Buy whisky and such other goods as may be
necessary for the Indians and I will order
vouchers given to cover the amount expended.
Leave nothing undone to insure success, and
have a sufficient number of men around to
allow no Indian to escape."
Be it said to the honor of G. W. Randolph
and President Jefferson Davis that when this
order came to their attention, Baylor's
career, both as military commander and
Governor of Arizona, went to smash. On
November 7, 1862, G. W. Randolph, Secretary
of War, C.S.A., wrote as follows to Baylor's
Commanding General, J. B. Magruder: "I have
the honor to invite your attention to the
inclosed copies of papers filed in this
office, and request you to communicate with
Colonel Baylor, and inform him in
consequence of his order with regard to the
Indians, that the authority to raise troops
granted by the Department is revoked. The
authority was to raise troops in Arizona
Territory, and if deemed necessary it may be
conferred on some other person. You will
proceed as soon as practicable to take such
steps as may be necessary to recover the
Territory of Arizona. You will also inform
Colonel Baylor that the President desires a
report from him in reference to the inclosed
order."
Brigadier General H. H. Sibley, in command
of the Confederate Army in New Mexico, in a
report to Adjutant and Inspector-General S.
Cooper is less brutal and bloodthirsty than
Colonel Baylor, but is favorable to the
enslavement of the Indians. "During the last
year, and pending the recent operations,
hundreds of thousands of sheep have been
driven off by the Navajos. Indeed, such were
the complaints of the people in this respect
that I had determined as good policy, to
encourage private enterprises against that
tribe and the Apaches, and to legalize the
enslaving of them."
The policy of General James H. Carleton,
Commanding the Department of New Mexico, is
best stated in an order to Colonel Kit
Carson, of October 12, 1862: "All Indian men
of that tribe are to be killed whenever and
wherever you can find them; the women and
children will not be harmed, but you will
take them prisoners and feed them at Fort
Stanton until you receive other instructions
about them. If the Indians send in a flag
and desire to treat for peace, say to the
bearer that when the people of New Mexico
were attacked by the Texans, the Mescaleros
broke their treaty of peace and murdered
innocent people and ran off their stock;
that now our hands are untied and you have
been sent to punish them for their treachery
and their crimes; that you have no power to
make peace; that you are there to kill them
whenever you find them; that if any beg for
peace their chiefs and twenty of their
principal men must come to Santa Fe to have
a talk here; but tell them fairly and
frankly that you will keep after their
people and continue to slay them until you
receive orders to desist from these
headquarters; that this making of treaties
for them to break whenever they have an
interest in breaking them will not be done
any more; that that time has passed by; that
we have no faith in their promises; that we
believe if we kill some of their men in fair
open war, they will be apt to remember that
it will be better for them to remain at
peace than to be at war. I trust that this
severity, in the long run, will be the most
humane course that could be pursued toward
these Indians."
May 15, 1862, the California Column was
organized under command of Colonel James H.
Carleton, and was ordered to make an
expedition into Arizona and New Mexico for
the purpose of recapturing all Federal forts
in these Territories, of driving out or
capturing the Rebel forces in that country,
and of reopening the southern mail route.
During the entire war this fine body of
volunteers from California had only one
engagement with the Confederate troops and
that a very minor one.
However, the California Column from 1860 to
1865 became a scourge and a terror to the
hostile Indians of Arizona and New Mexico.
But the California soldiers did not go
unscathed. June 15, 1862, General Carleton
sent three couriers with dispatches for
General Canby in New Mexico. On the
eighteenth these messengers were attacked by
Apaches, and two of them were killed. The
third, John Jones, made an amazing escape
and reached the Rio Grande. June 16, 1862,
Colonel Edward E. Eyre was ordered by
Carleton to make a reconnaissance in force
toward the Rio Grande in advance of the main
column. The command was unmolested by the
Indians until it reached Apache Pass. Here
about one hundred Indians appeared, but
their leader declared they were friendly to
the Americans. Later in the day, however,
three soldiers, who had imprudently detached
themselves from the main command, were found
dead, stripped of their clothing and
scalped. At one o'clock this same day, June
25, while Eyre was encamped two miles east
of the pass, six or eight shots were fired
into the camp by the savages, wounding
Assistant-Surgeon Kittridge and killing one
horse on the picket line.
July 8, 1862, General Carleton gave orders
for Captain Thomas L. Roberts, of the First
Infantry California Volunteers, to proceed
eastward from Tucson to the San Simon
accompanied by a wagon train with thirty
days' rations for Colonel Eyre's men. The
troops were to entrench themselves near the
San Simon Mail Station and guard the train
until the main column overtook them on its
march to the Rio Grande. Captain John C.
Cremony, of the Second California Cavalry,
with thirty-nine men was ordered to escort
the Government train of twenty-one wagons,
and to guard this train on its return trip
to Tucson. During the next two weeks Roberts
and Cremony and their troops saw service of
the most dangerous and grilling kind, and
gave proof of great bravery and skill in
battle.
At Dragoon Springs the soldiers were deluged
with torrential rains; but starting at five
P.M. July 14, Captain Roberts' troops, who
were in advance of Cremony and the train,
marched all night and until twelve o'clock
the next day and reached Apache Pass--a
distance of forty miles. At Apache Pass,
Mangas Coloradas with about two hundred
warriors had joined forces with more than
that number of Chiricahuas under Cochise.
Roberts with proper precautions entered the
pass with his almost exhausted troops, who
had had only a cup of coffee during their
nineteen-hour march. When they were about
two-thirds through, the Apaches opened fire
on them from behind rocks and trees and
tufts of bear grass. The soldiers fought
bravely, but to no avail, for their
ammunition was wasted against the invisible
foe. Roberts very wisely fell back to the
entrance of the pass and reformed his men.
He sent skirmishers into the hills so that
they could command the road, and loaded and
brought up his two howitzers. It was
absolutely necessary for the troops to reach
the springs, for both men and animals were
almost famishing for water after their
forty-mile march through July heat. Under a
galling fire from the savages, they advanced
steadily through the pass until they came to
the abandoned stone station house of the
Overland Mail. They were now within six
hundred yards of the springs. They found
shelter in the station house, but they could
not pause them; they must reach the water.
On two commanding heights above the springs
the Apaches had made crude redoubts with
loose stones. Through the openings between
the rocks that formed their breastwork they
kept up a hot fire on the soldiers below.
Under such circumstances the guns of the
troops were of little avail. But when the
howitzers were gotten into position, the foe
was treated to an effective and devastating
fire such as they had never known before.
The exact range was found and the shells
burst among the rocks, doing terrible
execution. Unable to stand in the face of
these strange engines of destruction, the
Apaches hastily abandoned their positions.
Later, in speaking of this battle, one of
the Indians said: "We were getting along
well enough until you began firing wagons at
us." Indeed, their loss was great. Three
were killed by musketfire and sixty-three by
exploding shells. How many were wounded, it
was impossible to estimate. Strange to say,
Roberts' loss during the entire six-hour
battle under conditions so unfavorable was
only two men killed and three wounded.
But the hardships of this sturdy band of
soldiers were not yet over. After drinking
and reenforcing themselves with a hasty
supper, Roberts, with one-half of his men,
started back to Ewell's station, fifteen
miles east of the pass, to make sure of the
safety of the wagon train, which Cremony was
bringing along under guard of a
comparatively small detachment. Several of
Cremony's cavalrymen had been detailed to
act with Roberts' advance company of
infantry as couriers. At the earliest
possible moment, Roberts had dispatched
these cavalrymen under Sergeant Mitchell to
inform Cremony how matters stood and to
assure him that as soon as he and his men
could get a cup of coffee he would come to
Cremony's relief with a body of his
infantry.
Upon reaching Cremony's encampment, the
Sergeant hastily related what had happened
to him and his comrades after leaving
Roberts. No sooner had they gotten out of
the pass than a company of mounted,
well-armed Apaches appeared in pursuit.
Three of their horses were killed under them
and a rifle shot fractured the arm of
Maynard, one of the cavalrymen, at the
elbow. Worse yet, it was believed that John
Teal, another private, had been cut off from
his companions by fifteen of the enemy and
killed. This last item of the report proved
to be untrue, for at one o'clock in the
night, bringing his saddle, saber, pistols,
and blanket with him, Teal appeared at
Cremony's camp.
What happened to this doughty warrior can
best be related in his own words as set down
in Captain Cremony's report. Said Teal:
"Soon after we left the pass, we opened up
upon a sort of hollow plain or vale, about a
mile wide, across which we dashed with
speed. I was about two hundred yards in the
rear, and presently a body of about fifteen
Indians got between me and my companions. I
turned my horse's head southward and coursed
along the plain, lengthwise, in the hope of
outrunning them, but my horse had been too
sorely tested and could not get away. They
came up and commenced firing; one ball
passed through the body of my horse. It was
then about dark and I immediately
dismounted, determined to fight it out to
the bitter end. My horse fell, and as I
approached him he began to lick my hands. I
then swore to kill at least one Apache.
Lying down behind the body of my dying
horse, I opened fire upon them with my
carbine, which being a breechloader enabled
me to keep up a lively fusillade. This
repeated fire seemed to confuse the savages
and instead of advancing with a rush, they
commenced to circle around me, firing
occasionally in my direction. They knew that
I also had a six-shooter and a sabre and
seemed unwilling to try close quarters. In
this way the fight continued for over an
hour, when I got a good chance at a
prominent Indian and slipped a carbine ball
into his heart. He must have been a man of
some note, because soon after that they
seemed to get away from me, and I could hear
their voices growing fainter in the
distance. I thought this a good time to make
tracks and I have walked eight miles since."
It was later learned that the Indian whom
Teal shot was the famous Mangas Coloradas.
He was severely wounded but later recovered.
About two o'clock in the night, Roberts and
his detachment reached Cremony's camp. After
a three-hour rest, and without breakfast,
for there was no wood to cook with, Roberts
and Cremony proceeded with the wagon train
to Apache Pass. Roberts and his men, in a
period of less than forty-eight hours, had
marched seventy miles and taken part in two
battles, almost without food and sleep. It
would seem that human endurance and
resolution could scarcely go further than
this. Roberts and Cremony reached the pass
about noon, July 16. After a good dinner,
the soldiers again fought off the Apaches
from the spring. Careful guards kept watch
throughout the night, and at eight in the
morning, skirmishing with the Indians as
they went, they marched out of the pass into
the open country to the east. In his report
to his superior officer, Roberts wrote:
"Very few of us had ever been under fire
before, but I do not know a case of
flinching. When we got through and out into
the open country, I called in my
skirmishers, saying that all who could not
walk might step to the front, and I would
provide a place for them to ride. Of the
entire company only two stepped to the
front."
Because of the wily and deadly hostility of
the Chiricahua Apaches, General Carleton
found it absolutely necessary to establish a
post in sinister Apache Pass. It was
impossible to move troops either eastward or
westward with safety unless they could have
assured access to the springs in this
canyon. For years it had been the practice
of the Apaches to lie in ambush here and
kill travelers who came to drink and to
water their animals. Colonel Eyre, with the
advance column, had lost three men here. As
has just been stated, Captain Roberts,
following with the wagon train, had fought
for six hours to gain possession of the
spring and had succeeded only after losing
four men killed and wounded. Accordingly,
July 27, as General Carleton was on the
march from Tucson to the Rio Grande, he
issued orders to establish Fort Bowie and
garrison it with one hundred men under
command of Major T. A. Coult, Fifth
Infantry, California Volunteers. The fort
was supplied from time to time by passing
troops with tents, ammunition, and rations.
The Commander of Fort Bowie was instructed
to attack the Apaches whenever he found them
near his post, to escort all trains and
couriers through the pass and well out into
the mesa, and to take the liberty of sending
out detachments strong enough to give
protection to soldiers and settlers when he
deemed it wise to do so.
The defenses were completed by August 4; and
in a dispatch to Carleton dated August 17,
1862, Coult gives interesting details
concerning the erection of this
fortification. The defenses were four in
number. "Alcatraz (I give the names applied
to them by the men who built them) is on the
left flank of the camp, 150 feet in length,
and commands every point within musket-range
in the Canyon toward the road and camping
ground of trains. Fort Point, on a slight
elevation, covers the rear of the camp and
the wagon road up the hill. It is 95 feet in
length. Bule Battery overlooks the country
and the approaches to the hill on the
southwest, or right flank, of the camp. It
is 97 feet long, and effectively covers and
protects the cattle corral and picket rope
of the cavalry detachment. Spring Garden
(guarding) overlooks the spring and commands
the ravine in which it is situated and every
point within musket-range around the spring.
This wall is 70 feet long. The total length
of wall around the post is 412 feet, the
height 4 to 4½ feet, and thickness from 2½
to 3 feet at bottom tapering to 18 inches to
2 feet at top, and built of stones weighing
from 25 to 500 pounds. The works are not of
any regular form, my only object being to
build defenses which could be speedily
completed, and at the same time possess the
requisites of sheltering their defenders,
commanding every aproach to the hill, and
protecting each other by flank fires along
the faces."
Captain E. D. Shirland, Company C,
California Volunteer Cavalry, reported a
sharp engagement with a large band of
Apaches late in August, 1862. He was
returning from an expedition to Fort Davis
when six mounted Indians approached him with
a white flag. They seemed to have nothing
particular to say for themselves when he
talked with them, and as twenty-five other
mounted men had appeared, and behind them a
large body on foot, Shirland became
convinced that the enemy was trying to get
him into a trap. He began a running fight,
hoping in this way to outdistance the
Indians, supposing that the mounted Apaches
would, of course, pursue him. They did so
for a time, but the soldiers made it too hot
for them and they dropped back. The Indians
left four dead on the field, and Shirland
believed that twenty more were wounded.
There were two soldiers wounded.
No important conflicts with the Apaches are
reported during the remainder of 1862.
General Carleton's grim order concerning the
extermination of all Apache warriors issued
to Kit Carson, October 12, and also to
Captains N. J. Pishon and William McCleave,
did not result in much bloodshed. McCleave
and Pishon made diligent efforts to catch
and kill the troublesome Mescaleros but
without success. These Apaches did not
approve of the policy of extermination
except as applied to the white. There was,
however, another aspect of Carleton's policy
toward hostile Indians which he had also
stated dearly--namely, concentration upon
reservations. This ultimatum became
effective as a result of the vigorous
campaign he had ordered. In a report to the
Adjutant-General of February 1, 1863, he
writes: "The Mescalero Apaches have been
completely subdued. I now have 350 of that
tribe at Fort Sumner and en route thither.
These comprise all that are left of these
Indians, except a few who have either run
off into Mexico or joined the Gila Apaches.
I shall try to settle what have come in on a
reservation near Fort Stanton and have them
plant fields for their subsistence the
coming year."
The activity of the Army against hostile
Indians during 1863 was almost unremitting;
yet the results were disappointing. General
Carleton states that "not over one scout in
four which was made against the Indians" in
1863 was at all successful. To describe in
detail the many petty combats and futile
expeditions of 1863 would make very dull and
barren reading. However, there were a few
thrilling events of lasting historic
importance during this year, and these I now
proceed to relate.
In a letter to the Adjutant-General of the
Army, dated January 2, 1863, General
Carleton announced his intention of
organizing an expedition to send against the
constantly hostile band of Apaches around
the headwaters of the Gila River, in the
region of the famous Copper Mines. Mangas
Coloradas was their chief. Carleton stated
that it was his intention after whipping
this murderous band to establish a fort near
Pinos Altos gold mines (in this same
locality), both to furnish protection to the
miners and for its moral and restraining
effect upon the Apaches. January 11 General
J. R. West, commanding the District of
Arizona, issued an order for four companies
of the California Volunteers under Captain
William McCleave to take the field against
these Gila Apaches, and so important was
this expedition considered that the General
himself accompanied it.
January 14 Captain E. D. Shirland was
detached from the main command, with twenty
men, and sent to capture Mangas Coloradas,
if possible, who was known to be in the
vicinity. In four days Shirland returned
with the captive chief. Mangas Coloradas in
his talks with Shirland asserted that he was
supreme in the region of the Copper Mines
and had authority over all of this tribe.
But when a member of the band was brought
before him red-handed for punishment, the
chief declared that he himself was innocent
and could not be held responsible for the
deeds of another. It was made dear to him
that no subterfuge would now avail; that his
plea for peaceful intention was only an
attempt to escape the punishment that he now
saw about to be inflicted upon his band. As
he had voluntarily placed himself in
Shirland's hands, West felt that he would
not be justified in executing him, but
decided at once that he should not be
allowed to go free to continue his
atrocities. He was told that he would be
held a prisoner the rest of his life; that
his family would be allowed to join him; and
that, if he made any attempt to escape, he
would instantly be killed. He was then
turned over to a military guard.
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