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Slavery in the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Nations
Slavery was an existing institution in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations at
the time of and prior to the treaties of 1830 and 1837, and the same general
rule regarding the status of the offspring of slaves seemed to have prevailed
there as in the neighboring States. Out of the social system thus existing
various conditions arose resulting in the following classes:
1. Where one parent was an Indian citizen (male or female) and the other a
noncitizen having the status of a free person. In such the offspring were
entitled to enrollment regardless of the race of the noncitizen parent.
2. Where one parent was an Indian citizen (male or female) and the other had the
status of a slave. Here the rule seems to have been that the offspring would
follow the mother; that is to say, if she were a slave her children would also
be slaves, as was the rule generally in slave-holding States, but if the mother
was an Indian citizen the children, would take her status regardless of the
status of the father.
Slavery in the Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations was abolished by Article II of the
treaty of April 28. 1866 (14 Stat., 769),
between the United States and the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Indians. Thereafter the old
distinction between "bond and free"'
vanished and all had the status of free
people, negroes "us well as Indians and
whites. Following this change in the law,
the child of an Indian citizen would not be
barred from enrollment simply because one of
its parents was formerly a slave. Children
thus born to free parents, following the
emancipation, were as fully entitled to
enrollment as children born to such parents
prior thereto.
After slavery had been abolished, the
negroes remained among (heir former owners,
and in the course of time there came to be
three classes of persons of mixed negro and
Indian blood residing in the
Choctaw-Chickasaw country. By comparison of
these claims with Ihe classes existing prior
to emancipation the citizenship rights of
such persons can be determined. The classes
are as follows:
1. Emancipated persons.
2. The offspring of emancipated persons by
negroes, whites, or other noncitizens.
3. Offspring of emancipated persons by
Indian citizens.
If the right to be transferred from the
freedmen rolls to the rolls of citizens by
blood of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations
relates only to the members of class 3; that
is to say, to the offspring of emancipated
persons by Indian citizens, the number of
persons who could possibly be accorded the
right of transfer would necessarily be
considerably less than would at first seem,
particularly as the number would be further
diminished by reason of the impossibility,
in many cases, to furnish satisfactory proof
of Indian blood.
My conclusion is that there are persons of
this class who are entitled to enrollment as
citizens by blood and that they have not had
due opportunity to prove their rights, also
that they have not been accorded by law
equal privileges with other persons having
Indian blood. I wish particularly in this
connection to call your attention to the
pictures of Blanche Wilson and her niece and
to the testimony relating1 to them, copy of
which is herewith.
(a) Adopted and intermarried whites and
their offspring claiming citizenship in the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. Not all
members of this class are entitled to
enrollment, but, on the other hand, there
are certain persons who failed to secure
enrollment whose cases are in all
substantial respects parallel to those of
other persons whose enrollment has been
approved. This is due partly to
jurisdictional reasons and partly to the
hurry incident to the closing of the
enrollment work at a fixed date.
It was the custom of the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Nations for years prior to the
treaties of 1830 and 1834 to add to their
membership by admitting white persons,
members of other Indian tribes, and others,
as appears from the records of the Indian
Office and from various acts of their
national councils passed from time to time
bearing upon the adoption of and
intermarriage with citizens. Former
provision was made for such persons in
Articles XXVI and XXXVIII of the treaty
entered into April 28, 1866 (14 Stat. 769,
777. 778). Said articles read as follows:
The right here given to Choctaws and
Chickasaws. respectively, shall extend lo
nil persons who have become citizens by
adoption or Intermarriage of either of said
tuitions, or who may hereafter become such.
Every white person who having married a
Choctaw or Chickasaw resides in the said
Choctaw or Chickisaw Nation, or who has been
adopted by the legislative authorities, is
to be deemed a member of said nation, and
shall be subject to the laws of the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Nations according to his
domicile, and to prosecution and trial
before their tribunals, and to punishment
according to their laws in all respects as
though he was a native Choctaw or Chickasaw.
It will be observed that these articles
refer to two classes of persons: (1)
Citizens by adoption and (2) citizens by
intermarriage, hut that no reference is made
in either article to the descendants of such
persons- nor is there anything in either to
show that the ceremony of marriage with
noncitizens was to be performed in any
particular manner or within any particular
jurisdiction; nor is theiT1 anything to show
that there was any intention at the date of
said treaty to impose a special rule upon
such persons not applicable to Indians by
blood, restricting their right to marry
noncitizens white persons and prescribing
penalty for so doing.
I have called attention to these features of
said articles because of the doctrine which
was adopted, in part at least, that the
rights acquired by adopted and intermarried
citizens were personal only. and that no
right of citizenship accrued after the death
of their Indian spouses to noncitizen white
women with whom they might intermarry or to
their offspring by such women.
About 10 years after the treaty of 1866 the
tribes adopted a legislative policy designed
to regulate marriages with noncitizens and
to limit the acquisition of citizenship
rights to such persons, to the exclusion of
others who might subsequently be connected
with them through second marriages.
By the act of November 9, 1875, relating to
intermarriage, the Choctaw Nation provided
in part as follows:
5. Should any man or woman, a citizen of the
United States or of any foreign country,
become a citizen of the Choctaw Nation by
intermarriage, as herein provided, and be
left a widow or widower, he or she shall
continue to enjoy the rights of citizenship:
unless he or she shall marry n white man or
woman or person, as the case may be, having
no rights of Choctaw citizenship by blood;
in that case all his or her rights acquired
under the provisions of this act shall
cease.
This section, as you will note, makes no
reference to the children resulting from
second marriages with noncitizens, but
presumably reference to them was thought
unnecessary under the circumstances. In
connection with this section the Attorney
General, in an opinion February 19, 1907, in
the Kingsbury-Littlepage case, expressed the
view that:
It is clear that at least since 1875 the
Choctaw Nation never intended that a white
persons intermarrying into the tribe should
have power to confer citizenship upon his
children by a subsequent, marriage to other
than a citizen by blood. The informal
opinion of Attorney General Moody (of Feb.
24, 1906) unquestionably had reference to
cases of this character.
The Chickasaw Nation also legislated upon
this subject. By act of October 19, 1876, as
amended September 24, 1887, it was provided
as follows:
Sec. 3. Re it further enacted. That no
marriage heretofore solemnized, or which may
hereafter be solemnized, between a citizen
of the United States and a member of the
Chickasaw Nation, shall enable such citizen
of the United States to confer any right or
privilege whatever in this nation, by again
marrying another citizen of the United
States, or upon such other citizen of the
United States or their issue.
This section is a repetition in substance if
not in exact terms of the act of 1870. which
before amendment read as follows:
Be it further enacted. That this act
shall not he construed so as to interfere
with marriages solemnized prior to the
treaty of 1866, and that it take effect and
be in force from and after it passes.
In the amended form the act also contains
the following provision:
Sec. 4. Be it further enacted. That all
acts or parts of acts coming in conflict
with the provisions of this act are hereby
repealed, and that this act take effect from
and after its passage.
Prefatory to what follows I desire to call
to your attention two features of the
Chickasaw act of 1876: It was aimed against
the extension of citizenship rights through
the marriage of an intermarried white
citizen to a later husband or wife who was a
''citizen of the United States," us well as
against "their issue." Such language
naturally challenges attention and invites
inquiry as to whether the same effect would
follow if the second marriage was entered
into with a man or women already a citizen
of the Choctaw or Chickasaw Nation by a
former marriage or by adoption. I will also
ask you to note the portions of said acts
which have been underscored, showing that
the act was not intended to affect marriages
solemnized prior to the treaty of 1866, and
that it was to take effect from and after
its passage.
Of course these acts rest solely upon the
power of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations
to legislate concerning the subject, and. as
they touch upon matters also covered by a
treaty with the United States, to wit, said
treaty of 1866, the most important question
of all is whether the said tribal acts are
in conflict with that treaty.
In the adjudication of the cases of white
persons it was doubtless thought at first
that it would prove easy to apply a uniform
rule, but this was a mistaken idea.
Different cases presented different
questions, and it soon became evident that
the principles applicable to one case were
not at all in point as to another. As has
been stated, the adoption of citizens had
its origin many years ago and the records
show that in the very early history of the
tribes foreigners were admitted to
citizenship. This was notably true of
missionaries, and it sometimes came to pass
that there was not only one generation in
adopted families, but two and even three
generations were embraced in such families.
All of this occurred in early days, before
anyone could be accused of ulterior motives
in seeking citizenship. This was true of
persons who joined the tribes as
missionaries, teachers, etc.
The different phases of the question can
best be seen by reference to the decision of
specific cases. I find that the United
States Court for the Central District of the
Indian Territory, in the case of F. R.
Robinson v. Choctaw Nation, wherein
Robinson, a white intermarried citizen,
married as his second wife a white
noncitizen, held that the treaty made every
white man who married a Choctaw or Chickasaw
woman a citizen in all respects as though he
were a native Choctaw or Chickasaw. and
that, by virtue of the treaty of 1866, there
was no difference between a citizen by
intermarriage and a native citizen: that all
were to enjoy equally and alike the benefits
of Choctaw citizenship as well as to share
the burdens. The court also held
specifically (1) that his marriage to n
white woman after the death of his Indian
wife did not decitizenize him. and (2) that
the offspring of such a marriage would be
entitled to enrollment, inasmuch as children
follow the citizenship of the father.
The view of the United States court was not
adopted, however, by the Choctaw-Chickasaw
citizenship court. The latter, in the case
of E. H. Bounds et al. The Choctaw and
Chickasaw Nations, wherein Bounds, a white
intermarried Choctaw, his second wife a
white non- citizen, and their children were
applicants for enrollment, held that Bounds
was entitled, but that his wife and children
were not. The right of Mr. Bounds was
expressly based upon Article XXXVIII of the
treaty of 1866. The court, referring to said
Article XXXVIII of the treaty of 1866, said:
The grant of the Government is to the
Indians and their descendants and heirs, in
apt and pointed language, in the patent and
treaties before that. If this treaty
designed to give intermarried, not only
white persons and adopted white persons, but
also their purely white descendants, any
rights, why did it not declare, then, in
1866 in that treaty that such further rights
as claimed now were conferred by adding the
words their heirs and descendants"?
The question was presented to the Department
of the Interior in the regular course of the
enrollment work in the case of Mary
Elizabeth Martin. There it was held by the
Secretary of the Interior, approving the
opinion of the Assistant Attorney General of
March '24. 1905, that the applicant was
entitled to enrollment. The record shows
that in her case she was born about 1891 to
Walker Martin and Sallie Moore Martin, his
wife, both being white intermarried
citizens, the father having previously
married Bettie Munroe, a Choctaw, and the
mother having previously married Nelson
Munroe a Chickasaw. Both Indian spouses died
prior to the marriage of the applicant's
parents. The Assistant Attorney General
discussed the case at considerable length,
quoting the decision of both of the courts,
referred to above but accepting the view
announced by the United States court in the
Robinson case, holding that Mary Elizabeth
Martin was born to the allegiance of her
father and that it was unnecessary to write
the word "descendants" in said Article
XXXVIII of the treaty of 1866.
The question was brought to the attention of
the President, who called upon the Attorney
General for a report thereon. The latter, in
a letter dated February 24, 1906, advised
the President that a memorandum had been
prepared in his office expressing the view
that the fair and reasonable construction of
the treaty of 1866 was that a white person
by marriage with an Indian acquired only
personally the rights and privileges of
citizens by blood and not the capacity to
confer citizenship upon others, adding that
he did not think the question free from
doubt, although convinced from the reasoning
in said memorandum that the interpretation
therein suggested was the better one and
would lead to more just results.
This report was forwarded February 27, 1906,
to the Secretary of the Interior, with the
following note from the Secretary to the
President:
In the President's judgment, without any
reference to the act of Congress, it is
perfectly clear that equity demands that the
son of white parents who has no Indian blood
In him. even though one of those parents may
have been adopted into a tribe, should not
be treated as an Indian.
In view of the report of the Attorney
General and the President's opinion
expressed in connection therewith, the
Secretary of the Interior, on April 24,
1908, rendered a decision denying the
application of Mary Elizabeth Martin for
enrollment.
As it appeared from the statement of the
Attorney General that his report to the
President was based upon a letter dated
January 26, 1906. from the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the
Interior, under date of March 14, 1906.
requested of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs a copy of said letter. The latter,
under date of March 14, 1906, complied with
this request, inclosing also copies of
several letters, written in 1886 and prior
thereto, to various individuals relating to
the subject of Indian citizenship. The
Secretary of the Interior was not convinced
by the letters cited by the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, and on April 24, 1906, in a
letter of some length to the commissioner,
pointed out his objections to the letter's
citations. Subsequently he submitted to the
Attorney General, under date of May 29,
1906, two Choctaw enrollment cases, one
being that of Myrtie Randolph and her
brother, W. J. Thompson. The other was the
case of Cyrus H. Kingsbury and his sister,
Lucy E. Littlepage. In a letter of same date
the Secretary of the Interior set forth
fully and at considerable length the views
entertained by him concerning the rights of
white children, and in so doing devoted
considerable attention to the history of the
Choctaw Nation, as well as its laws,
treaties, and customs.
The Secretary's letter of May 29, 1906,
together with the cases submitted therewith,
were considered by the Attorney General in
his opinion of February 19, 1907, and after
setting forth the facts in the
Randolph-Thompson case and noting
particularly that the decision adverse to
the applicants had been rendered by the
citizenship court, expressed the view that:
Whatever their intrinsic merits, these
chums have been finally decided adversely to
the claimants by the judgment of the
citizenship court.
The Attorney General then took up the cases
of Kingsbury and Littlepage. Their right to
enrollment was based primarily upon an act
of the Choctaw Council of November 15, 1854,
granting all the rights, privileges, and
immunities of Choctaw citizens "unto John
Parker Kingsbury and to his wife, Hannah
Mariah." Under this act said persons were to
enjoy all benefits to which citizens of the
nation might thereafter be entitled, except
in the participation of any sum of money
which might then be due the nation under
treaty stipulations theretofore made.
It further appeared in the case of these
applicants that the names of both were
enrolled on the tribal Choctaw census roll
of 1885, and that they had been in other
ways recognized as citizens of the nation,
having been born and raised therein. This
case the Attorney General decided in favor
of the claimants, and, after discussing the
opinion or report previously rendered by the
Department of Justice on the same subject,
stated as follows:
The case of the present applicants is
quite different from that just referred to.
Here both parents were adopted into the
tribe. It must have been contemplated that
they might have children and, if so, what
was to be their citizenship if not that of
their parents?
In this case it will be noted that both
parents were made citizens by adoption. By
reason of this fact I desire to refer again
to the case of Mary Elizabeth Martin. There
both parents were also citizens by
intermarriage, one of the Choctaw and the
other of the Chickasaw Nation. The law gave
such persons the right to marry and there
was no bar to their marriage with each
other. Could it be properly held that each,
having become an Indian citizen by
intermarriage, lost that citizenship by
marriage to the other? In other words, was
it possible that, by the intermarriage of
two citizens, both became noncitizens?
Furthermore, what would be the citizenship
of children born in such a household? As the
Attorney General said in the case of the
parents of Kingsbury and Littlepage, '' it
must have been contemplated that they might
have children, and, if so. what must be
their citizenship if not that of their
parents? " This feature of the Mary
Elizabeth Martin case seems to have been
overlooked.
As I have suggested before, new cases as
they arose presented different points for
consideration. Subsequent to the opinion of
the Attorney General of February 10, 1907.
the Department of the Interior was called
upon to determine whether Martha Black and
her children should be enrolled as citizens
of the Chickasaw Nation. There Martha Black
originally acquired citizenship in the
Chickasaw Nation by intermarriage with one
Thomas Bacon, who was the son of Harvey
Bacon, a white missionary adopted into the
Chickasaw Nation in Mississippi prior to the
treaty of May 24, 1834. After the death of
said Thomas Bacon, his wife. Martha Black,
married George Black, a white noncitizen, by
whom she had two children. In this case it
was held by the Secretary of the Interior,
approving the opinion of the Assistant
Attorney General of February 28. 1907, that
Mrs. Black and her children were entitled to
enrollment. Here it was reasoned that Thomas
Black was a full citizen of the Chiekasaw
Nation, being the descendant of a fully
adopted white person; that he was not in the
position of an intermarried white person,
but. in legal status, he and his ancestor
were Indians since prior to 1834. and within
the opinion of the Attorney General of
February 19, 1907. in the case of Kingsbury
and Littlepage.
There was another point decided in this
case, based upon the fact that Martha Black
was a Cherokee by blood. It was held that
she did not lose her citizenship by marrying
George Black, for the reason that the
in-marrying and out-marrying provisions of
the Chickasaw act of October 19, 1876, had
no reference to Indians of other tribes, but
only to citizens of the United States.
There is one more case of importance which
was decided by the Secretary of the Interior
along this line. Approving the opinion of
the Assistant Attorney General of March
4,1907, in the case of Henry E. Burks, he
pointed out the cases to which the Choctaw
and Chickasaw marriage act of 1875 and 1876
had reference, as well as to those to which
said acts did not apply. It appears that
Burks's parents, at the time of their
marriage, were already Indian citizens by
former marriages, his mother being an
intermarried Choctaw and his father an
intermarried Chickasaw, and that their
marriage to each other occurred prior to the
treaty of 1866. The Assistant Attorney
General expressed the view that the Choctaw
act of 1875 was not intended to be
retroactive; that it would certainly seem
inequitable in the extreme to apply it to
persons who married prior to the treaty of
1866, or to their offspring born prior to
that date, and that accordingly there
appeared to be no lawful bar in such cases
to the enrollment of the children as native
born Choctaws.
He also pointed out that, inasmuch as the
Chickasaw act of 1870 was to take effect
from and after its passage and in view of
the use of the word "shall " therein, as
well as the inhibition contained in section
14 of Article I of the constitution of the
Chickasaw Nation against retrospective laws,
that said act was designed to have a
prospective effect only and that it was
intended to prevent an intermarried white
from conferring Chickasaw citizenship by a
second marriage upon a "citizen of the
United States,'' or upon the issue resulting
from such marriage, but that manifestly a
marriage with a person who had theretofore
become a member of either of said nations
would not be such a marriage as would come
within the terms of the statutes.
These difficult questions were pressing for
solution at the time when the volume of work
following the opinion of the Attorney
General of February 19, 1907, was at its
high-water mark, and there was insufficient
time to give the complicated questions the
attention which was their due. There are two
cases which I desire especially to bring to
your notice because I met the applicants
during the course of my field investigation.
Important information concerning the people
in these cases is to the effect that the
equities are very strong in them and that
they are entitled, both by reason of the
good character they bear in the communities
where they live and the long years of
industry and good citizenship, to a large
measure of consideration. The first of these
cases is that of tire said William J.
Thompson and his sister, Myrtie Randolph,
which was disposed of on jurisdictional
grounds by the Attorney General on February
19, 1907, as noted above. This Mr. Thompson
is also identified as the William J.
Thompson who furnished me the affidavit of
November 21, 1908, relative to the Choctaw
rolls and records which were retained in the
office of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish. The
father of this William J. Thompson and
Myrtie Randolph was Giles Thompson, a white
man who became a citizen, by intermarriage,
of the Choctaw Nation prior to the treaty of
1830. and whose name is mentioned therein.
His membership in the tribe antedated its
removal to the Indian Territory. After the
removal of the tribe west he resided with
the Choctaw people and was uniformly
recognized in many ways as a citizen. As
appears from the recently discovered rolls,
he was enrolled by the tribal authorities in
1874. His children were born in the
Choctaw-Chickasaw country and have always
resided therein, having been educated in the
Indian school and accorded generally the
privileges of other citizens of said
nations. They feel that their father was one
of the Choctaw citizens to whom the grant of
the western lands was made pursuant to the
treaty of September 27, 1830, and that as
the grant was to inure to said citizens and
to their descendants they come literally
within the terms of the treaty. The seeming
objection to their case is that their
father, subsequent to the death of his
Indian wife, married a white woman and that
they are the issue of such marriage.
Evidently this case is not parallel to that
of the white children whose rights were
discussed in the report of the Attorney
General of February 24, 1906. William J.
Thompson states that the former slaves of
his father were enrolled as Choctaw freedmen
because they were the slaves of a Choctaw
citizen, but that although he is the son of
that same citizen he is without citizenship
rights in the Choctaw Nation. It would seem
that the equities in this case are fully as
great as in the case of
Kingsbury-Littlepage.
The second of the equitable cases which I
desire to bring to your attention is that of
John Ward and his sister, Sarah A. York.
Their father, Samuel Ward, became an
intermarried citizen of the Choctaw Nation
September 29, 1848, through intermarriage
with Minerva Thompson, a Choctaw woman.
After the death of his Indian wife and on
October 14, 1852, he married Eliza Jane
Ramsey, who was a Cherokee Indian by blood,
and was then residing in the Choctaw Nation.
Mr. Ward and Mrs. York, who now seek
enrollment, are the issue of that marriage.
I am unable to state their ages, but judge
from their appearance they must have been
born prior to the treaty of 1866. Enrollment
rights are now claimed by them and their
descendants. Mr. Ward has served as deputy
sheriff and has filled other important
offices in the Choctaw Nation, having been
one of the most potent influences therein
for law, order, and civilization. He and his
sister claim they were born in the Choctaw
Nation, educated therein, and have always
lived there: that they have improved lands,
erected buildings, and that the work of
their whole lifetime is at stake. Decision
adverse to them was rendered by the
Choctaw-Chickasaw Citizenship Court.
There are two facts in their history
deserving of special attention. First, they
are Cherokees by blood, being descendants of
a woman who was a regularly enrolled
Cherokee, and have resided, through the
comity which existed between the tribes in
the Indian Territory, all their lives in the
Choctaw Nation, and, second, the marriage of
their father to his Indian wife occurred
prior to the treaty of 1866. Accordingly
there is no clear bar to their enrollment as
Cherokees by blood, but they do not seek
such enrollment because they have always
resided in the Choctaw Nation and all their
property rights are there. Nor is it clear
that they are not entitled to enrollment as
native-born Choctaws. Their father at the
time of the treaty of 1866 was residing in
the Choctaw Nation and having theretofore
married a Choctaw woman came literally
within the terms of Section XXXVIII of the
treaty of 1866. He and all other persons
like situated became adopted citizens by
force of that article, even if they were not
such prior to 1866. His children, if born
prior to the treaty, were already vested
with citizenship rights at the date thereof,
and if born subsequent thereto were entitled
to all the rights of adopted citizens. Under
the circumstances it would appear that their
case is fully as meritorious as the cases of
Kingsbury-Littlepage and Martha Black et al.
Based upon the different opinions referred
to above and the various cases which have
come to my attention, my conclusion is that
the doctrine of "personal right," as applied
to naturalization in said tribes, or to
admission to citizenship therein, should not
be held to affect (1) the offspring of
persons who acquired citizenship through
"adoption." (2) the offspring of
intermarried whites or others resulting from
marriages to noncitizens subsequent to the
death of their Indian spouses, provided that
the subsequent marriage was contracted prior
to the act of November 9, 1875, if in the
Choctaw Nation, or prior to October 19,
1876, in. the Chickasaw Nation, (3) the
offspring of intermarried whites each of
whom, by a prior marriage, acquired Choctaw
or Chickasaw citizenship, and (4) the
offspring of intermarried citizens resulting
from marriages to non- citizens subsequent
to the death of the Indian spouses through
whom citizenship was originally acquired,
provided that either of the parents of such
offspring was an Indian by blood of some
other tribe.
As to the white children of intermarried
citizens born after the death of their
Indian spouses to noncitizen whites as the
result of marriages contracted subsequent to
said acts of November 9, 1875, and October
19, 1876, I am convinced that their rights
have never had that full consideration which
the questi6n is entitled to receive by
reason of its importance. The point involved
in their cases is more difficult than the
question affecting the intermarried whites,
which was-referred to the Court of Claims
and finally decided, on appeal, by the
Supreme Court of the United States. But I
think that the members, as a class, have
never been represented by attorneys at any
hearing and that, as such, they have never
had the opportunity to present brief of
argument or to be heard. Even in the matter
of Mary Elizabeth Martin, there is nothing
in the report of the Attorney General of
February 24, 1906, to show that the record
in tin- case was before him or that the
applicant was represented in any way. In
that report the Attorney General pointed out
that the question was not free from doubt.
That this is true is also evident from the
diverse nature of departmental decisions
which have been rendered in the matter.
I also think that the cases of those
intermarried whites who were denied
enrollment should be reconsidered where
their alleged rights were based upon
marriages contracted prior to the said acts,
according to the nation in which citizenship
was claimed.
Identified Mississippi Choctaws who
were not finally enrolled because they
failed to furnish proof of removal to and
settlement in the Choctaw-Chickasaw country.
By section 41 of the act of July 1, 1902 (32
Stat., 641), it was required (1) that
Mississippi Choctaws should remove to the
Choctaw-Chickasaw country within six months
following the date of their identification
as such, and (2) that they should make proof
of such settlement to the Commission to the
Five Civilized Tribes within one year after
said date. The duties imposed by this
section were so arduous that a large number
of identified Mississippi Choctaws, mostly
full-blood Indians, were compelled to forego
all benefits contemplated by the act. The
total number of persons identified as
Mississippi Choctaws was 2,534. but only
1,445 were finally enrolled. Thus there were
1,089 persons entitled under the law who
failed to secure its benefits. This
difference was due in part to the closing of
the enrollment work on a fixed date. There
was a considerable number of persons in
whose favor decisions were rendered during
the latter part of February or in the early
part of March. 1907, for whom it would have
been a physical impossibility to remove to
the Indian Territory and furnish proof of
settlement therein prior to March 4. 1907.
There were others, as I found from personal
investigation, who removed to the
Choctaw-Chickasaw country and who, failing
to find work or other means of sustenance
during the 3-year period preceding the
issuance of patents to such persons, were
compelled to return to their old homes in
order to provide the necessities of life.
There were still others who removed to the
Indian Territory and who selected
"provisional" allotments but were induced by
speculators to lease their land for an
inadequate consideration and to leave the
country. As such leases were usually for
long periods of time, the continued absence
of the allottee was very much to the
advantage of the lessee.
(p) Children whose parents, although
identified as Mississippi Choctaws, were not
finally enrolled as citizens because they
failed to establish proof of their removal
to and settlement in the Choctaw-Chickasaw
country within the time required by law.
The rights of these children, if living
March 4, 1906, are substantially the same as
of their parents. See opinion of the
Assistant Attorney General of February 16
1907, in the Mississippi Choctaw case of
Nicholas Charles et al.
Notes About the Book:
Source: Five Civilized Tribes In Oklahoma, Reports of the Department of the
Interior and Evidentiary Papers in support of S. 7625, a Bill for the Relief of
Certain Members of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, Sixty-second Congress,
Third Session, Published 1913, by the Department of the Interior, United States.
Online Publication: The manuscript was scanned and then ocr'd. Minimal editing
has been done, and readers can and should expect some errors in the textual
output.
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