While we know our northern friends may not feel it, in the South, Spring is
here. So we thought we'd share a few of our gardening sites appropriate
for this time of the year. Along with gardening, there's grilling, and getting
ready to diet so that you can fit back into that bathing suit this summer!
In another part of his testimony, Major
Anthony said referring to the Arapaho, "I
considered them differently from the
Cheyenne," and when asked if they were with
the Cheyenne at Sand Creek, replied, "I
understood, afterwards, that some six or
eight or ten lodges of the Arapaho were
there."
Major S. G. Colley, the Indian agent, said
in his testimony, "Left Hand's band had gone
out to Sand Creek," and when asked how many
were in Left Hand's band, replied, "About
eight lodges of about five to the lodge."
If there were no other evidence, the
following telegrams from General Curtis,
Commander of the Department of Missouri, are
in themselves sufficient proofs of the
hostility of both Cheyenne and Arapaho:
Ft. Leavenworth, April 8th,
1864.
To Colonel Chivington:
I hear that Indians have
committed depredations
on or near Platte River. Do not
let district lines pre-vent
pursuing and punishing them. S.
R. CURTIS, Major-General.
Ft. Leavenworth, May 30th,
1864.
To Colonel Chivington:
Some four hundred Cheyenne
attacked Lieut. Clayton on Smoky
Hill. After several hours fight
the Indians fled, leaving
twenty-eight killed. Our loss
four killed and three wounded.
Look out for Cheyenne
everywhere. Especially instruct
troops in upper Arkansas.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.
Ft. Leavenworth, October 7,
1864.
Major-General Halleck, Chief of
Staff:
General Blunt came upon a party
of Arapaho and other hostile
Indians supposed to be four
thousand, with fifteen hundred
warriors, on the twenty-fifth
ultimo. This was about one
hundred miles west of Lamed on
Pawnee fork. The Indians
overpowered the advance, but the
main force coming up routed and
pursued them. Ninety-one dead
Indians were left and we lost
two killed and seven wounded.
General Blunt's force was less
than five hundred. He pursued
for several days.
S. R. CURTIS, Major-General.
The place where this battle occurred was
about one hundred and thirty miles east of
the Sand Creek battle-ground, and probably
some of the same Indians were in both
encounters.
The telegrams I have quoted indicate that
General Curtis was fully alive to the
situation. Evidently he believed the
Cheyenne and Arapaho were hostile and was
not in favor of making peace with them until
they had been punished.
On account of his limited force, Colonel
Chivington could do little more than protect
the lines of travel; consequently, all that
summer and fall the frontier settlers were
compelled to take care of themselves. And it
was not until after the Third Colorado had
been organized and equipped that he was able
to strike a decisive blow. In his deposition
presented at the investigation by the Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War, among
other things, Colonel Chivington has the
following to say concerning the battle of
Sand Creek and the conditions leading up to
it.
"On the 29th day of November, 1864, the
troops under my command attacked a camp of
Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians at a place
known as Big Bend of Sandy, about forty
miles north of Fort Lyon, Colorado
Territory. There were in my command at that
time about (500) five hundred men of the
Third Regiment Colorado cavalry, under the
immediate command of Colonel George L.
Shoup, of said Third Regiment, and about
(250) two hundred and fifty men of the First
Colorado cavalry; Major Scott J. Anthony
commanded one battalion of said First
regiment, and Lieutenant Luther Wilson
commanded another battalion of said First
regiment.
The Third regiment was armed with rifled
muskets, and Star's and Sharp's carbines. A
few of the men of that regiment had
revolvers. The men of the First regiment
were armed with Star's and Sharp's carbines,
and revolvers. The men of the Third regiment
were poorly equipped; the supply of
blankets, boots, hats, and caps was
deficient. The men of the First regiment
were well equipped; all of these troops were
mounted. 1 had four 12-pound mountain
howitzers, manned by detachments from
cavalry companies; they did not belong to
any battery company.
"From the best and most reliable information
I could obtain, there were in the Indian
camp, at the time of the attack, about
eleven or twelve hundred Indians; of these
about seven hundred were warriors and the
remainder were women and children I am not
aware that there were any old men among
them. There was an unusual number of males
among them, for the reason that the war
chiefs of both nations were assembled there,
evidently for some special purpose."
"What number did you lose in killed, and
what number in wounded and what number in
missing?"
"There were seven men killed, forty-seven
wounded, and one was missing.
"From the best information I could obtain, I
judge that there were five or six hundred
Indians killed; I cannot state positively
the number killed, nor can I state
positively the number of women and children
killed.
Officers who passed over the field, by my
orders, report that they saw but few women
and children dead, no more than would
certainly fall in an attack upon a camp in
which they were. I myself passed over some
portions of the field after the fight, and I
saw but one woman who had been killed,
and one who had hanged herself; I saw no
dead children. From all I could learn, I
arrived at the conclusion that but few women
or children had been slain. I am of the
opinion that when the attack was made on the
Indian camp the greater number of squaws and
children made their escape, while the
warriors remained to fight my troops.
"I do not know that any Indians were wounded
that were not killed; if there were any
wounded, I do not think they could have been
made prisoners without endangering the lives
of the soldiers; Indians usually fight as
long as they have strength to resist. Eight
Indians fell into the hands of the troops
alive, to my knowledge; these with one
exception were sent to Fort Lyon and
properly cared for.
"My reason for making the attack on the
Indian camp was that I believed the Indians
in the camp were hostile to the whites That
they were of the same tribes with those who
had murdered many persons and destroyed much
valuable property on the Platte and Arkansas
rivers during the previous spring, summer,
and fall was beyond a doubt. When a tribe of
Indians is at war with the whites, it is
impossible to determine what party or band
of the tribe or the name of the Indian or
Indians belonging to the tribe so at war,
are guilty of the acts of hostility. The
most that can be ascertained is that Indians
of the tribe have performed the acts. During
the spring, summer, and fall of the year
1864, the Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians, in
some instances assisted or led on by Sioux,
Kiowa, Comanche, and Apaches, had committed
many acts of hostility in the country lying
between the Little Blue and the Rocky
Mountains and the Platte and Arkansas
rivers. They had murdered many of the whites
and taken others prisoners, and had
destroyed valuable property, probably
amounting to $200,000 or $300,000. Their
rendezvous was on the headwaters of the
Republican, probably one hundred miles from
where the Indian camp was located. I had
every reason to believe that these Indians
were either directly or indirectly concerned
in the outrages that had been committed upon
the whites. I had no means of ascertaining
what were the names of the Indians who had
committed these outrages other than the
declarations of the Indians themselves; and
the character of Indians in the western
country for truth and veracity, like their
respect for the chastity of women who may
be-come prisoners in their hands, is not of
that order which is calculated to inspire
confidence in what they may say. In this
view I was supported by Major Anthony, 1st
Colorado Cavalry, commanding at Fort Lyon,
and Samuel G. Colley, United States Indian
Agent, who, as they had been in
communication with these Indians, were more
competent to judge of their disposition
toward the whites than myself. Previous to
the battle they expressed to me the opinion
that the Indians should be punished. We
found in the camp the scalps of nineteen
white persons. One of the surgeons informed
me that one of these scalps had been taken
from the victim's head not more than four
days previously. I can furnish a child
captured at camp ornamented with six white
women's scalps. These scalps must have been
taken by these Indians or furnished to them
for their gratification and amusement by
some of their brethren, who, like
themselves, were in amity with the whites.
"I had no reason to believe that Black
Kettle and the Indians with him were in good
faith at peace with the whites. The day
before the attack Major Scott J. Anthony,
1st Colorado Cavalry, then commander at Fort
Lyon, told me that these Indians were
hostile; that he had ordered his sentinels
to fire on them if they attempted to come
into the post, and that the sentinels had
fired on them; that he was apprehensive of
an attack from these Indians and had taken
every precaution to prevent a surprise.
Major Samuel G. Colley, United States Indian
Agent for these Indians, told me on the same
day that he had done everything in his power
to make them behave themselves, and that for
the last six months he could do nothing with
them; that nothing but a sound whipping
would bring a lasting peace with them. These
statements were made to me in the presence
of the officers of my staff whose statements
can be obtained to corroborate the
foregoing.
"Since August, 1863, I had been in
possession of the most conclusive evidence
of the alliance, for the purposes of
hostility against the whites, of the Sioux,
Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, Kiowa and
Apache Indians.
"Their plan was to interrupt, or, if
possible, entirely prevent all travel on the
routes along the Arkansas and Platte rivers,
from the states to the Rocky Mountains, and
thereby depopulate this country.
"With very flew troops at my command, I
could do little to protect the settlers,
except to collect the latest intelligence
from the Indians' country, communicate it to
General Curtis, commanding department of
Missouri, and warn the settlers of the
relations existing between the Indians and
the whites, and the probability of trouble,
all of which I did.
"Commanding only a district with very few
troops under my control, with hundreds of
miles between my headquarters and the
rendezvous of the Indians, with a large
portion of the Santa Fe and Platte routes,
besides the sparsely settled and distant
settlements of this Territory to protect, I
could not do anything till the 3rd regiment
was organized and equipped, when I
determined to strike a blow against this
savage and determined foe. When I reached
Fort Lyon, after passing over from three to
five feet of snow, and greatly suffering
from the intensity of the cold, the
thermometer ranging from 28 to 30 degrees
below zero, I questioned Major Anthony in
regard to the whereabouts of hostile
Indians. He said there was a camp of
Cheyenne and Arapaho about fifty miles
distant; that he would have attacked before,
but did not consider his force sufficient;
that these Indians had threatened to attack
the post, etc., and ought to be whipped, all
of which was concurred in by Major Colley,
Indian agent for the district of the
Arkansas, which information with the
positive orders of Major-General Curtis,
commanding the department, to punish these
Indians, decided my course, and resulted in
the battle of Sand Creek, which has created
such a sensation in Congress through the
lying reports of interested and malicious
parties.
"On my arrival at Fort Lyon, in all my
conversations with Major Anthony, commanding
the post, and Major Colley, Indian Agent, I
heard nothing of this recent statement that
the Indians were under the protection of the
government, etc., but Major Anthony
repeatedly stated to me that he had at
different times fired upon these Indians,
and that they were hostile, and, during my
stay at Fort Lyon, urged the necessity of my
immediately attacking the Indians before
they could learn of the number of troops at
Fort Lyon, and so desirous was Major Colley,
Indian agent, that I should find and also
attack the Arapaho, that he sent a messenger
after the fight at Sand Creek nearly forty
miles to inform me where I could find the
Arapaho and Kiowa; yet, strange to say, I
have learned recently that these men,
Anthony and Colley, are the most bitter in
their denunciations of the attack upon the
Indians at Sand Creek. Therefore, I would,
in conclusion, most respectfully demand, as
an act of justice to myself and the brave
men whom I have had the honor to command in
one of the hardest campaigns ever made in
this country, whether against white men or
red, that we be allowed the right guaranteed
to every American citizen, of introducing
evidence in our behalf to sustain us in what
we believe to have been an act of duty to
ourselves and to civilization."
Colonel George L. Shoup, in a deposition
presented to the military commission
investigating the battle of Sand Creek,
among other things, says:
On or about the 12th of
November, 1864, I left Denver
for Fort Lyon, with Companies C,
D, and F of my regiment and
Company H of the First Colorado
Cavalry, and on or about the
18th of November joined Major
Sayre at Boonville with that
portion of the regiment which
had been left at Bijou Basin (he
having been ordered to precede
me), consisting of Companies A,
B, and E, and I and M. On or
about the 20th Captain Baxter
joined the command with Company
G, and the day following Colonel
John M. Chivington, commander of
the district of Colorado,
arrived and assumed command of
the column, I still commanding
my regiment. On or about the 22d
the column, consisting of my
regiment and a battalion of the
first, marched from Boonville
towards Fort Lyon and reached
Fort Lyon on the 28th, and went
into camp. On the evening of the
28th I received orders from the
colonel commanding to prepare
three days' cooked rations, and
be ready to march at eight
o'clock the same evening. At
eight o'clock the column marched
in the following order: the
first regiment on the right, my
regiment on the left. I had
under my immediate command
between five hundred and fifty
and six hundred men mounted. My
transportation was left at Fort
Lyon. The column marched all
night in a northerly direction.
About daylight the next morning
came in sight of an Indian
village. Colonel Chivington and
myself being about three-fourths
of a mile in advance of the
column, it was determined to
make an immediate attack.
Lieutenant Wilson, commanding a
battalion of the first, was
ordered to cut off the ponies of
the Indians at the northeast of
the village. By order of Colonel
Chivington, I was ordered to
send men to the southwest of the
village, to cut off the ponies
in that direction, and then to
immediately engage the Indians.
"Did Colonel Chivington make any
remarks to the troops, in your
hearing?"
"He did not."
"Did you approach the camp of
the Indians in line of battle
with your men mounted, or
dismounted?"
"Kept my men in columns of fours
till I arrived at the village,
when I formed them in line of
battle, and to the left of a
battalion of the first,
commanded by Lieutenant Wilson,
my men mounted."
"At what distance was your
command from the village when
you commenced fire upon it?"
"I did not allow my men to fire
when I formed my first line; the
battalion on my right was
firing. I wheeled my men into
columns of fours and marched to
the rear of the battalion on my
right, to the right of that
battalion, to obtain a better
position. I marched up Sand
Creek some distance, following
the Indians who were retreating
up the creek. When opposite the
main body of Indians, wheeled my
men into line, dismounted, and
opened fire."
"Did you know what band of
Indians it was at the time of
the attack?"
"I heard while at Fort Lyon that
Left Hand, of the Arapaho, and
Black Kettle, of the Cheyenne,
were at the village."
"Did you, at any time prior to
the attack, hear Colonel
Chivington say that he was going
to attack Black Kettle's band?"
"I did not."
"How long did the fight last?"
"The fighting did not entirely
cease until about three o'clock
in the afternoon."
"Did you camp with your regiment
near the battle-ground?"
"We camped on ground occupied by
the Indians before the battle."
"What was done with the Indians
and other property?"
"The lodges were burned. The
ponies, numbering, as I was
told, five hundred and four,
were placed in charge of the
provost marshal. A few remained
in the hands of the troops."
"What were the casualties of
your regiment?" "Ten killed, one
missing, about forty wounded."
"In your opinion how many
Indians were killed?" "From my
'own observation I should say
about three hundred.
"Were they men, or women and
children?"
"Some of each."
"Did you witness any scalping or
other mutilation of the dead by
your command?"
"I saw one or two men who were
in the act of scalping, but I am
not positive."
"Were you present in council
with some Indian chiefs in
Denver, some time last simmer or
fall?"
"I was."
"Who were present whites and
Indians?"
"Governor Evans, Colonel
Chivington, Captain S. M.
Robbins, Major Wynkoop, Major
Whiteley, Amos Steck, J. Bright
Smith, Nelson Sargent, Captain
John Wanless, Black Kettle,
White Antelope, and five or six
other Indians, and John Smith
and Sam Ashcroft, interpreters."
"Did the Indians express a
desire for peace with the
whites?"
"Yes."
"Upon what terms did they desire
peace?"
"That they have protection and
supplies while the war was
carried on against hostile
Indians."
"Was peace guaranteed to them on
any terms?"
"They were told by Colonel
Chivington that if they would
come in and surrender
themselves, he would then tell
them what to do."
"What did the governor tell
them?"
"That as they had violated all
treaties they would have to
treat with the military
authorities, to whom he had
given up all the authority."
"Did Colonel Chivington tell
them that he would guarantee
them peace only on condition
that they would come into the
post and lay down their arms?"
"Colonel Chivington did not
guarantee them peace upon any
terms, but if they would come
into the post, surrender
themselves, and lay down their
arms, he would tell them what to
do."
"Did the Indians say that they
would do so?" "They said that
they would go back to their
people, tell them and advise
them to do so."
"Did you have any
conversation with Major Colley,
Indian agent for the Arapaho and
Cheyenne of the Upper Arkansas,
respecting the disposition of
the Indians and the policy that
ought to be pursued towards
them? If so, state what he
said."
"I had an interview with Major
Colley, on the evening of the
28th of November, in which he
stated to me that these Indians
had violated their treaty; that
there were a few Indians that he
would not like to see punished,
but as long as they affiliated
with the hostile Indians we
could not discriminate; that no
treaty could be made that would
be lasting till they were all
severely chastised; he also told
me where these Indians were
camped."
"State what you heard Major
Scott J. Anthony say in
reference to these Indians on
the 28th of November last."
"He said he would have fought
these Indians before if he had
had a force strong enough to do
so, and left a sufficient
garrison at Fort Lyon, he being
at the time in command of Fort
Lyon."
The Hon. S. H. Elbert, Acting Governor of
Colorado, in a message to the Legislature, a
few months after the affair, reflects the
general attitude of the people toward the
battle, and those participating in it. The
following is an extract from it:
The before unbroken peace of our Territory
has been disturbed since the last spring, by
an Indian war. Allied and hostile tribes
have attacked our frontier settlements,
driven in our settlers, destroyed their
homes, attacked, burned, and plundered our
freight and emigrant trains, and thus
suspended agricultural pursuits in portions
of our country, and interrupted our trade
and commerce with the States. This has for
the time seriously retarded the prosperity
of our Territory.
